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INTRODUCTION 
 
Everyone agrees that health law is important, but no one agrees on what it is. Any subset of 
law that channels two trillion dollars a year1
                                                 
∗ Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. © 2008, Nan D. Hunter. I deeply appreciate the comments 
of my Georgetown colleagues at a faculty workshop presentation, as well as feedback from members of the 
Insurance Law and Society Seminar at Harvard Business School and participants in a panel on new governance in 
health care at the 2007 Law and Society Conference. Special thanks to Stelios Xenakis for research assistance and to 
Chai Feldblum for more than I can say. 
1 According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, total health care expenditures for 2007 are projected to reach $2.3 trillion. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND 
MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NAT’L HEALTH EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 2006–
2016 tbl.1, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/proj2006.pdf (last visited May 24, 
2008). 
 merits serious attention, but scholars differ as to 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1213090
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whether health law is an intellectually coherent field or a variation on “the law of the horse.”2
                                                 
2 Sooner or later in any discussion of the intellectual viability of health law as a field, someone trots out the analogy 
of “the law of the horse.” See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Some Thoughts on Academic Health Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 391, 404 (2006) (“If a specter is in fact haunting health law, that specter appears to be ‘The Law of the 
Horse.’”). The reference is to an essay by Judge Frank Easterbrook using the phrase to describe cyberlaw. See Frank 
H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207. Easterbrook argued that 
cyberlaw was simply another industry-specific category, not a coherent doctrinal field. Id. As with horses, one could 
collect and analyze cases dealing with transactions that happened to concern the industry—sales of its products or 
services, licensing, liability for accidents involving it, etc.—and call that a field, but he argued that law professors 
instead should “study general rules” such as torts or contracts, and apply them to cyberspace, or horses (or the health 
care system). Id. at 208.  
 
These scholars wrestle with a maze of doctrinal paths in health law that pass through torts, 
contracts, antitrust, bioethics, constitutional law and administrative law (among others), but seem 
to have no conceptual center.  
I argue in this Article that the best approach to understanding health law lies in focusing on 
the practices of governance in health care, rather than on the various legal doctrines implicated in 
health care delivery. Specifically, I argue that understanding the law that structures and regulates 
American health care today as a system of governance organized around principles of risk 
management and distribution can provide us with a new and better paradigm for health law. 
What we have today is not your grandmother’s health care system. The last thirty years have 
brought us three major changes: a widespread transformation from fee-for-service doctor-patient 
encounters to a system of managed care; a shifting of financial risk for health care expenditures 
away from insurers and onto providers and patients; and the construction of what amounts to 
employer corporate sovereignty in the formulation and administration of risk pools for group 
health insurance in the workplace.  
These three phenomena have had dramatic effects on the underlying functions of health law. 
Risk allocation and insurance principles now dominate the structure of health care access and 
delivery. The discourse of risk and insurance has migrated from traditional finance questions into 
what has long been thought of as the heart of health care and health law: the doctor-patient 
relationship. As a result, I argue, the primary function of health law has become to manage, 
articulate and institutionalize a system of governance based on the principle of protection against 
financial, as well as clinical, risk.  
Consider a simple example of the hegemony of risk-related discourse. Although there is 
constant talk about “universal access to health care,” the policy issues that comprise that debate 
actually concern universal access to health insurance. We all assume that the latter serves as a 
proxy for the former. And yet, without any explicit acknowledgment on our part, we allow the 
phrase’s shift in meaning to import to our understanding of “care” all of the questions and trade-
offs that inevitably arise from the pooling and pricing of risk that are intrinsic to insurance.  
For purposes of this Article, I take the care/insurance transposition at face value, as correctly 
reflective of our country’s system of health care today. I then use it as a springboard to raise 
broader theoretical and normative questions. This Article thus has three goals: to develop risk 
governance as a new theoretical paradigm for understanding the health care system and thereby 
for understanding health law as a field; to demonstrate how risk governance has encouraged the 
rise of corporate sovereignty through health insurance law; and finally, to propose new 
experimentalist structures within a risk-governance model that can be used to democratize our 
current health care system. 
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The organization of the Article tracks those goals. Part I develops the claim that the last 
twenty years has produced a health care system centered on the measurement and allocation of 
risk, or what I call “risk governance.” I describe the material bases that resulted in what I term 
“actuarial medicine,” explicate the new knowledges that support such medicine, and identify the 
normative tensions inherent in that system.  
In Part II, I argue that understanding risk governance as the driving force in health care 
today provides us with the most coherent paradigm for understanding health care law as a field. I 
use the example of judicial interpretation of fiduciary duty—an issue that bridges doctrines of 
contract, tort and insurance law—to show how conceptualizing health law as a mechanism of 
risk governance offers a more holistic and integrated conceptualization of health law than the 
other models offered to date. 
Part III deconstructs and re-interprets the main body of law that allocates financial risk in 
private health insurance: the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). I argue that 
the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of ERISA preemption has delegated risk pooling 
functions to employers in a manner that creates a realm of corporate sovereignty in health law. 
Courts interpreting ERISA have granted quasi-jurisdictional status to employer risk pools. 
Contrary to most scholars, I argue that the proper way to remedy the inequities produced by 
current law is not by curbing ERISA preemption and expanding state tort liability, but rather by 
constructing creative and workable mechanisms to remedy the democracy deficit in the corporate 
sovereignty of employer risk pools. 
Part IV embarks on that endeavor. Most political sociologists assume that framing health 
issues around the concept of risk will invariably produce more conservative, neoliberal political 
outcomes. By contrast, I argue that the political valence of “risk” is subject to multiple 
appropriations, including ones that could generate ongoing pressures to move in a more 
egalitarian direction. I outline the advantages of building on workplaces to create politically 
infused risk pools, drawing on new governance literature in the employment field to suggest 
incremental and pragmatic steps to foster more democratic structures for health risk governance. 
Throughout, I seek to develop an analysis based in legal and political theory to illuminate 
how the practices and institutions of risk governance drive the contemporary American health 
care system. 
 
I. A THEORY OF RISK GOVERNANCE IN HEALTH CARE 
 
The story of the late twentieth century health care system is the story of the rise of risk as an 
organizing principle.3
                                                 
3 My argument about the political and intellectual dominance of risk analysis in health care draws on an emerging 
body of work in legal theory and the sociology of law that examines how the framework of risk has developed into 
an explanatory model extending to fields such as criminal law and social welfare policy. Two leading scholars in the 
field, Tom Baker and Jonathan Simon, have analyzed the spread of risk discourse from the insurance context into a 
variety of legal mechanisms for “governing through risk.” Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, Embracing Risk, in 
EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 1, 11 (Tom Baker & Jonathan 
Simon eds., 2002). I share Baker and Simon’s orientation in focusing on the social construction of risk: “we are less 
interested in what is a risk than we are in what is done in the name of risk.” Id. at 18. Perhaps the most 
comprehensive single treatment of the impact of risk analysis on jurisprudence is JENNY STEELE, RISKS AND LEGAL 
THEORY (2004). Steele, a British law professor, explores a number of different approaches to risk, including its 
usefulness as a “collective technology” relevant to issues of distributive justice. Id. at 33–38, 57. Jonathan Simon’s 
work examines risk discourse in criminal law, arguing that it constitutes a “powerful” tool “with which to interpret 
and frame all forms of social action as a problem for governance.” JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH 
 In health care, risk has dual dimensions: the financial risk of providing and 
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paying for health care and the clinical risk of illness and death. Neither category is new to health 
care. What has changed dramatically has been the relative importance of and interpenetration 
between these two dimensions of risk.  
The concern paid in the health care system today to financial risk is inextricably intertwined 
with the attention paid to clinical risk. At the systemic level of health care delivery, one can no 
longer fully separate the management of care and of clinical risk from the management of 
financial risk. Clinical and administrative techniques designed to control some aspect of risk 
have reshaped the practice of medicine, resulting in what I call “actuarial medicine.” Doctors and 
patients function today, however hesitantly or reluctantly, as prime actors in an economy of risk. 
This Part analyzes how governance organized around risk allocation has become a dominant 
force in the health care system. Because risk governance is a relatively new concept in legal 
scholarship, section A defines that term and argues that a discourse of risk managerialism is the 
driving force behind governance in our contemporary health care system. Section B describes the 
material bases that contributed to the rise of risk managerialism and that resulted in the actuarial 
medicine we have today. It also describes the new knowledges that support the practice of 
actuarial medicine and exposes the normative issues underlying the system.4
A. GOVERNANCE THROUGH A DISCOURSE OF RISK MANAGERIALISM 
  
 
 
This Article refers to a system of “governance,” rather than to the prohibitory or regulatory 
products of “government.” That is because governance analysis permits us to move easily back 
and forth across public-private boundaries, providing insights into a unified discourse that 
channels the actions of providers, payers, and patients, whether in public or private health care 
systems.5
Using the conceptual framework of governance foregrounds the insight that “‘the conduct of 
conduct’”
  
6
                                                                                                                                                             
CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 17 
(2007). Commenting on future directions, Mariana Valverde et al. call for more study of “what kinds of risk 
knowledge moves are made by the various participants in particular legal networks, and with what legal, social and 
epistemological effects.” Mariana Valverde et al., Legal Knowledges of Risks, in LAW AND RISK 86, 87 (Law 
Comm’n of Can. ed., 2005). This Article offers a response to Valverde, in the context of health law. 
4 My analysis of risk governance in health care is also a friendly amendment to the characterization by several health 
policy experts that the late-twentieth-century period marked the “industrialization” of American health care. See 
Gary S. Belkin, The Technocratic Wish: Making Sense and Finding Power in the “Managed” Medical Marketplace, 
22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 509, 510 (1997); J.D. Kleinke, The Industrialization of Health Care, 278 JAMA 
1456 (1997). While many of the elements of industrialization, such as standardization, apply to the changes in the 
health care system that I will analyze, others, such as greater division of labor, do not. Moreover, I would argue that 
understanding the changes as a shift from the primacy of concern with clinical risk to at least an equal concern with 
financial risk provides a stronger framework for analyzing health care than the industrialization model, which is 
better suited for manufacturing enterprises. 
5 See generally Nan D. Hunter, “Public-Private” Health Law: New Directions in Public Health, 10 J. HEALTH CARE 
L. & POL’Y 89 (2007) [hereinafter Hunter, Public-Private Health Law] (describing governance and governmentality 
theories both generally and specifically within health care). 
6 Colin Gordon, Governmental Rationality: An Introduction, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN 
GOVERNMENTALITY 1, 2 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991) (quoting Michel Foucault). 
 involves power exchanges that cross the borders between government, the market, 
civil society, and private life. Rather than a model of social control that emanates from actions of 
the state, governance theory begins with an understanding that the channeling of actions, 
resources, and policies is far more complex than a top-down model implies. “Governance” 
denotes a conceptualization of power that is circular rather than subject-verb-object 
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unidirectional, networked rather than hierarchical, and multi-dimensional beyond the state, 
encompassing nonjuridical zones such as market forces or culture.7 Governing, in this sense, is 
comprehensive and multidimensional; it is “to structure the possible field of action of others.”8
For legal scholars, governance theory offers a rich method for analyzing the intersection of 
law and norms, of legal and extra-legal discourses. Law can be understood as one set of 
institutional practices and embodied understandings that may be manifest in public or private 
sector policies, knowledges, social relations and identities.
  
9
The conceptualization of governance as occurring as much through private as through public 
sector mechanisms fits particularly well with the American health care system, with its thorough 
intermingling of public and private structures. Public financing systems underwrite private sector 
health care for 87 million Americans through the Medicare and Medicaid systems.
 Norms may serve the objectives of a 
variety of regulatory institutions, including but not limited to the state.  
10 The 
privately financed workplace system of health insurance depends on a hefty public subsidy 
through tax law.11 American hospitals are a mix of public and private institutions, the latter 
including both for-profit and not-for-profit corporate forms.12 Licensing decisions are made by 
state agencies for individual physicians,13 while a private accreditation organization provides the 
most significant oversight for hospitals.14
                                                 
7 See Hunter, Public-Private Health Law, supra note 
 Statutory authority in forty-one states and the District 
5, at 91–92. This description captures the strand of governance 
best categorized as governmentality theory. See id. at 90–92 (making distinctions between three concepts of 
governance: dominant state authority; public-private models for administrative governance (often called “new 
governance” or “administrative governance”); and governmentality). For purposes of this Article, I draw from both 
administrative governance and governmentality literature. 
8 3 MICHEL FOUCAULT, The Subject and Power, in POWER: ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT, 1954–1984, at 326, 
341 (James D. Faubion ed., 2000). 
9 See ALAN HUNT & GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND LAW: TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AS GOVERNANCE 46–
50 (1994); Hugh Baxter, Bringing Foucault into Law and Law into Foucault, 48 STAN. L. REV. 449, 452–63 (1996) 
(book review). 
10 Medicare covers slightly more than 44 million persons. See StateHealthFacts.org, Total Number of Medicare 
Beneficiaries, 2008, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=290&cat=6 (last visited May 24, 
2008). Medicaid covers just under 43 million. See StateHealthFacts.org, Monthly Medicaid Enrollment, December 
2006, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=201&cat=4 (last visited May 24, 2008. Both 
numbers include more than six million “dual eligibles,” persons enrolled in both programs, an overlap 
structured so that the Medicaid programs pays Medicare premiums for persons who qualify for Medicare 
but lack the funds to pay the premiums.  See http://facts.kff.org/chart.aspx?cb=50&sctn=136 (last visited 
August 8, 2008).  
11 See ALLEGRA N. KIM, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, FED. TAX INCENTIVES FOR HEALTH INS. 1–4 (2007), available at 
http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/07/02/07-002.pdf; see also U.S. CONG., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW 
AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO THE TAX TREATMENT OF HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND OTHER HEALTH EXPENSES 
(2006), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-27-06.pdf. In 2004, the total federal and state tax subsidy for 
employment-based coverage amounted to just under $210 billion. See John Sheils & Randall Haught, The Cost of 
Tax-Exempt Health Benefits in 2004, HEALTH AFF., W4-109 exh.1 (Feb. 25, 2004), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w4.106v1. 
12 See Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law, and Ethics of Not-for-Profit 
Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345, 1346–48 (2002–2003). 
13 See ROBERT I. FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION IN AMERICA: COMPLEXITY, CONFRONTATION, AND 
COMPROMISE 22–24 (2007). 
14 See id. at 44–46; see also Eleanor D. Kinney, Private Accreditation as a Substitute for Direct Government 
Regulation in Public Health Insurance Programs: When Is It Appropriate?, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 54–55 
(1994). 
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of Columbia permit private sector judging companies to run the appeal systems for the denial of 
private or public system health insurance coverage.15
If we think of governance metaphorically as a kind of epistemological meta-technology,
  
In these myriad ways, the fusion of public and private characterizes virtually every aspect of 
American health care and health law, to the point that health law cannot be confidently 
categorized today as either public law or private law. Because public-private hybridity is also 
intrinsic to governance theory, the logical structure of a governance model is closely homologous 
to the public-private institutional structure of the health care system. It is a natural fit. 
16
Risk managerialism means the framing of the practices of medical institutions, and the 
correlative legal doctrines of health law, around the project of allocating various forms of risk. In 
concrete terms, risk managerialism operates through the alignment of incentives and deterrents 
for actors, throughout the health care system, based on probabilities that can be calculated.
 
we can imagine it as providing the framework for channeling the various substantive and 
ideological streams that circulate through any number of institutions. Using this model for 
purposes of analyzing the health care system, I suggest we think of a discourse of risk 
managerialism as the substantive core, the driving force, behind the dynamics of governance in 
our contemporary health care system.  
17
 I explore in more specificity below the knowledges created in the health care system that 
instantiate risk managerialism. But a factor central to the impact of risk managerialism is the 
extent to which it alters the very identities and social relations associated with medical practice. 
In a watershed moment in 1978, Alain Enthoven called for physicians to shift away from their 
traditional approach to medical care as an art of healing and to move toward quantitative 
techniques in their delivery of health care.
  
18 His description of “a synthesis of principles of 
economics, statistics, probability, and decision theory [to be] applied to the complex and 
uncertain problems of medical decision making”19
Enthoven’s primary motivation for suggesting such a shift was not to minimize financial risk 
for providers. That story was yet to come. Rather, his objective was to increase the cost 
effectiveness of medical care.
 could serve as a definition of the forms of risk 
analysis that dominate health care practice today.  
20 But his argument was of a piece with those beginning to be made 
by one of his Stanford colleagues, David Eddy, whose work drove the movement for evidence-
based medicine: the claim that statistical analysis of outcomes should drive clinical decisions.21 
Evidence-based medicine has spawned a cultural revolution within the profession, one that is still 
under attack from many physicians as “cookbook medicine.”22
                                                 
15 See Nan D. Hunter, Managed Process, Due Care: Structures of Accountability in Health Care, 6 YALE J.HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 93, 93 (2006). 
16 I use this phrase to mean a broadly conceptual mechanism for framing our understanding of how systems and 
institutions function and toward what ends. 
 
17 See STEELE, supra note 3, at 6–7, 18–20; Francois Ewald, Norms, Discipline and the Law, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 
138, 142–44 (Spring 1990). 
18 See Alain C. Enthoven, Shattuck Lecture—Cutting Cost Without Cutting the Quality of Care, 298 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1229 (1978).  
19 Id. at 1236. 
20 Id. at 1229. 
21 See, e.g., MICHAEL L. MILLENSON, DEMANDING MEDICAL EXCELLENCE: DOCTORS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 49–50, 128–36, 336–40 (1997). 
22 See Trisha Greenhalgh, Narrative-Based Medicine in an Evidence-Based World, 318 BRIT. MED. J. 323 (1999); 
Marshall B. Kapp, “Cookbook” Medicine: A Legal Perspective, 150 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 496 (1990). But see 
KATHRYN MONTGOMERY, HOW DOCTORS THINK: CLINICAL JUDGMENT AND THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 206 (2006) 
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Actuarial techniques and practices have begun to foster new subjective identities for patients 
as well as for physicians. Just as ethical standards for professionals have been reshaped to 
incorporate a conscious knowledge of financial as well as clinical risk, so too have the norms 
changed for the responsible patient, who is now expected to do her part for the greater good by 
consuming health care prudentially. One aspect of the doctrine of moral hazard is that insurers 
seek to minimize pooling those risks which individuals can control.23 The civic duty of self-
management has become a central part of the rhetoric of health care policy, embedded in 
narratives that merge concepts of what is healthy, what is insurable and what is ethical.24
B. THE RISE OF ACTUARIAL MEDICINE 
 
 
 
1. Material Bases 
 
A number of factors gave rise to risk managerialism as the dominant discourse of 
governance in our health care system. The primary causes were the hyperinflation in the health 
care industry during the 1970s and 1980s; the influence of neoclassical economists who 
dominated the policy scene at the time and provided the intellectual support for using financial 
risk to manage costs; and finally, the resulting dominance of managed care over fee-for-service 
delivery systems, with myriad approaches used by managed care structures, and sometimes by 
doctors themselves, to shift financial risk to providers.  
Inflation was widespread in the American economy in the 1970s, but it was worse in health 
care than in other sectors. Annual gross expenditure levels in medical care began to spike in the 
late 1970s, producing a rate of inflation that was a multiple of the inflation in other sectors.25
                                                                                                                                                             
(defending the role of statistical studies in clinical judgment). The impact on the profession has spread beyond the 
United States. See MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION 104–09 (1997) (describing the 
adoption of “clinical audit” systems by Britain’s National Health Service). 
23 In general, moral hazard refers to the incentive provided by insurance to engage in actions that, without insurance, 
one would be reluctant to take. Insurers thus prefer to offer policies protecting against risks over which an insured 
lacks control rather than those which an insured can decide to assume. CAROL A. HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND 
RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS 9, 149–50 (1985). 
24 One of countless possible examples would be a newspaper advertisement by an insurance company exhorting 
readers “to be healthier in mind and body” and “to change your life for the better and the good.” See Sarah 
Nettleton, Governing the Risky Self: How to Become Healthy, Wealthy and Wise, in FOUCAULT: HEALTH AND 
MEDICINE 207, 207 (Alan Peterson & Robin Bunton eds., 1997). The health narrative fits into a long history of 
insurance companies relying on eligibility criteria that turn on the good or bad “characters” of those applying for 
coverage. See Tom Baker, Insuring Morality, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 559, 561 (2000) [hereinafter Baker, Insuring 
Morality]; Brian J. Glenn, The Shifting Rhetoric of Insurance Denial, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 779, 785 (2000). 
25 The inflation rate in the medical sector compared to the overall U.S. inflation rate was 8.7% versus 5.5% from 
1980 to 1985; 7.5% versus 4.0% from 1985 to 1990; and 6.3% versus 3.1% from 1990 to 1995. See Andre Hampton, 
Resurrection of the Prohibition on the Corporate Practice of Medicine: Teaching Old Dogma New Tricks, 66 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 489, 502 n.78 (1998). As Henry Aaron and Joseph Newhouse pointed out, it is important to note that 
“inflation” can be a misleading term with regard to health care because, although medical sector expenses have 
unquestionably shot up, the data do not tell us how much of the increase is attributable to inflationary prices for 
essentially the same product and how much reflects increased prices for increased quality. See HENRY J. AARON, 
SERIOUS AND UNSTABLE CONDITION: FINANCING AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE 41–42 (1991) (quoting in part Joseph 
Newhouse). 
 
These cost increases affected not only payers of health care (primarily insurance companies), but 
also purchasers of health insurance, such as employers. From 1976 to 1988, the cost of 
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employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) doubled.26 After a pause in the mid-1990s, the sharp 
upward spiral in costs has resumed.27 Between 2002 and 2007, the cumulative growth in health 
insurance premiums was seventy-eight percent, far outstripping rates of inflation and wage 
growth.28
How situations are defined, of course, establishes the parameters for what kinds of policy 
responses “make sense.” The economics-oriented experts who had “outlived, outtheorized, and 
outmaneuvered” those who saw the health care system more in political or social welfare terms
 
29 
framed “the health polity as a sector of the economy.”30
In this environment, the goal of controlling costs leapt to the top of the health policy agenda 
and has remained there ever since. Both payers and purchasers, in both public and private 
sectors, embarked on a series of initiatives designed to curb costs.
 They argued that budget-breaking costs 
had created the problem and that new forms of financial discipline could become the solution. 
Indeed, for the neoclassical economists who were achieving political and intellectual dominance 
at the time, health care was a perfect problem on which to train their attention. The problem was 
of enduring urgency, and it was occurring in an economic zone where few market models had 
already failed because so few had been tried. 
 31
The initial focus of this campaign centered on influencing physicians to incorporate cost 
consciousness and fiscal discipline into their provision of services, a consciousness and 
discipline perceived as generally lacking in the fee-for-service system.
  
32 An early byproduct of 
those efforts was utilization review—the calculation of the number and nature of treatments 
prescribed, by patient and by physician.33
                                                 
26 Thomas Bodenheimer & Kevin Grumbach, The Reconfiguration of U.S. Medicine, 274 JAMA 85, 87 (1995). 
27 John K. Iglehart, Changing Health Insurance Trends, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 956, 957 (2002); Bradley C. Strunk 
et al., Tracking Health Care Costs, HEALTH AFF., ¶ 9 & exh.1 (Sept. 26, 2001), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w1.39v1/DC1 (showing that the rate of increase in health care 
spending dropped below the growth rate in gross domestic product during 1994–1997, but outpaced it in subsequent 
years). 
28 KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2007 ANNUAL 
SURVEY 18, 19 exh.1.1 (2007), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7672/upload/76723.pdf. 
29 Daniel M. Fox, Health Policy and the Politics of Research in the United States, 15 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 
481, 496 (1990). 
30 Id. at 489. 
 Data from utilization review were used to create 
treatment norms for particular conditions and to deny reimbursement when services were 
provided for treatments outside the norm. The assumption was that providers would incorporate 
these lessons of reimbursement denials into the future provision of services. When that discipline 
proved inadequate, utilization review achieved a more direct cost control by setting up 
31 See id. at 495; see also Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 26, at 87; Peter Swenson & Scott Greer, Foul 
Weather Friends: Big Business and Health Care Reform in the 1990s in Historical Perspective, 27 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. 605, 609–610 (2002). 
32 In the fee-for-service system, insurers deferred to the certification by providers that the treatments and services 
which they had provided were medically necessary and reimbursement followed. See MARK A. HALL, MAKING 
MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS & ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 66–67 (1997). This is 
not to say, of course, that physicians had no awareness of the financial incentives that were created by the indemnity 
method of reimbursement. See Deborah A. Stone, The Doctor As Businessman: The Changing Politics of a Cultural 
Icon, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 533, 534 (1997) (arguing that “the role of money in the doctor-patient 
relationship” has long been controversial ). 
33 A typical definition of utilization review is the following, taken from the Maine Department of Insurance: “[a] 
program used in managed care plans . . . [involving reviews of] the necessity, use, appropriateness, efficacy or 
efficiency of health care services, procedures, providers, or facilities.” Maine Bureau of Insurance, Glossary of 
Insurance Terms, http://www.maine.gov/pfr/insurance/glossary.htm. 
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monitoring and policing procedures by which payers denied reimbursement in advance for care 
that fell outside the treatment norms for a particular condition.34 A similar process occurred with 
hospitals.35
The 1990s saw a massive transformation to managed care structures for the delivery of 
health care services. The essence of managed care is non-fee-for-service reimbursement of 
providers, combined with delivery mechanisms that limit care, such as primary physicians who 
function as “gatekeepers” for referrals to specialists and limited provider networks.
  
But utilization review, whether retrospective or prospective, was only the tip of the iceberg. 
Denials of reimbursement, or required pre-approval of services, could still be consistent with a 
fee-for-service structure. The real story began to happen at the institutional level.  
36 Large 
health insurance purchasers, primarily employers who sponsor workplace-based group plans, 
increasingly opted for the cost savings promised by managed care oversight of expenses.37 By 
1999, all but eight percent of those who had insurance through their workplace were enrolled in 
health care plans that were based on some form of managed care.38
A variety of options were used in these plans to structure the contractual agreements with 
providers in a manner that would control costs. Traditional health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs) constituted only a small segment of the options used.
  
39 Most options built on existing 
provider structures but entailed some form of assumption of risk by the provider. Down-
streaming of financial risk to providers through capitation systems was the most common 
approach.40 “Capitation” refers to the practice by which a provider would agree to accept a 
patient for a set reimbursement amount paid each month (regardless of the actual services used 
by the patient) and would commit to providing that patient with all needed services. The provider 
then carried the burden of ensuring that her pool of patients included the right mix to result in a 
profit at the end of the year.41
Down-streaming of financial risk to providers through capitation systems was generally 
paired with down-streaming of utilization management.
  
42 Once providers began bearing the 
financial risk of providing services to patients, many payers saw advantages in allowing those 
same providers to have control over their utilization management, allowing the risk-bearing 
entity to control its own costs.43
These institutional changes continued in a cascading series of developments. Solo and small-
group physician practices consolidated into larger entities to achieve greater efficiency and 
  
                                                 
34 See Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
1637, 1652–54 (1992). 
35 See, e.g., Wickline v. State of California, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 1634 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
36 PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE MANAGED CARE ERA 8 (2002). 
37 See Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 26, at 87–88; JACOB S. HACKER, THE ROAD TO NOWHERE: THE 
GENESIS OF PRESIDENT CLINTON’S PLAN FOR HEALTH SECURITY 14–15 (1997) [hereinafter HACKER, THE ROAD TO 
NOWHERE]. 
38 See R. Adams Dudley & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care in Transition, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1087, 1087 (2001).  
39 HMOs are one form of managed-care organizations. They are more tightly structured and more closely regulated 
than other forms. See GEORGE D. POZGAR, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 412 (8th ed. 2003). 
40 See Thomas Rice, Financial Incentives as a Cost-Control Mechanism in Managed Care, in THE PRIVATIZATION 
OF HEALTH CARE REFORM: LEGAL AND REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES 99, 103 (M. Gregg Bloche ed., 2003). 
41 See id. at 101. 
42 See Alice A. Noble & Troyen A. Brennan, Managing Care in the New Era of “Systems-Think”: The Implications 
for Managed Care Organizational Liability and Patient Safety, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 290, 292 (2001). 
43 Id. 
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control in their pools of patients.44 Scaling up, networks of these providers, including hospitals, 
formed.45 As James Robinson, a leading economist, has noted: “[t]he growth and diffusion of the 
multi-specialty medical group, paid prospectively and delegated authority for utilization 
management, is the single most important development in the contemporary organization of 
medicine.”46
As provider entities and networks grew larger, some sought to maximize their revenue and 
control by cutting out the managed care organization (MCO) completely and directly offering 
their own managed care products.
 
47 Professional societies, such as the American Medical 
Association, provided technical and financial support to doctors who were developing business 
models that involved assuming insurance-style risk on their own.48 And as a surge of such 
networks declared bankruptcy,49 state insurance commissioners began to wrestle with whether or 
how to classify medical practitioners as insurers for purposes of establishing criteria for solvency 
and rate-setting.50
2. Actuarial Medicine 
  
 
 
Specific financing arrangements in managed care are, of course, “constantly adapting and 
changing,” and “‘bedside’ rationing” incentives “vary in their intensity.”51
The result is what I call “actuarial medicine.”
 But by the mid-1990s, 
all three of the economic dynamics I describe above—massive cost increases, the dominance of 
managed care over fee-for-service, and the undertaking of financial risk directly by physicians 
and other providers—had taken hold.  
52
                                                 
44 In 1983, 75.8% of physicians were self-employed, including 40.5% in solo practices; 24.2% were employees of 
managed care or other organizations. In 1999, the self-employed figure had dropped to 61.8%, with only 28.4% in 
solo practice. The percentage of physicians who were employees had risen by more than 50%, to 38.2%. The trend 
is even more pronounced among new practitioners. See Dudley & Luft, supra note 
 In today’s health care system, the merger of 
coverage and care decisionmaking means that “the calculation between cost and clinical 
38, at 1089. Another study 
examined the number of physicians who practiced either alone or with one other physician, and found that there was 
a decrease from 40.7% in 1996–1997 to 32.5% in 2004–2005. See Allison Liebhaber & Joy M. Grossman, 
Physicians Moving to Mid-Sized, Single-Specialty Practices, 18 CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE 
TRACKING REPORT 1 Fig.1 (Aug. 2007), available at http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/941/941.pdf. 
45 See JAMES C. ROBINSON, THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE: COMPETITION AND INNOVATION IN HEALTH 
CARE 211 (1999) [hereinafter ROBINSON, CORPORATE PRACTICE]. 
46 Id. at 91. 
47 See Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 26, at 88–89; Dudley & Luft, supra note 38, at 1088.  
48 The American Medical Association (AMA) established a Physicians Capital Source project in 1994 to match 
doctors with investors and to furnish assistance in writing business plans and on general management questions. One 
AMA official stated that “[p]hysicians are very concerned about whether they will have a place in the market of the 
future.” Alicia Ault Barnett, Do Health Plans Change Course When Doctors Take the Helm?, 13 BUS. & HEALTH 
32, 32 (1995). 
49 See Brant S. Mittler & André Hampton, The Princess and the Pea: The Assurance of Voluntary Compliance 
Between the Texas Attorney General and Aetna’s Texas HMOs and Its Impact on Financial Risk Shifting by 
Managed Care, 83 B.U.L. REV. 553, 563–67 (2003). 
50 See ROBINSON, CORPORATE PRACTICE, supra note 45, at 232; Ericka L. Rutenberg, Managed Care and the 
Business of Insurance: When Is a Provider Group Considered To Be at Risk?, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 267, 
267 (1996). In 1995, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners issued guidelines for the regulation of 
such arrangements under state insurance codes. Id. For a case study of how one state used its regulatory powers to 
cope with medical practices assuming financial risk, see Mittler & Hampton, supra note 49, at 572–577. 
51 Noble & Brennan, supra note 42, at 292. 
52 The term “actuarial medicine” has not previously been used in legal scholarship.  
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effectiveness is no longer a struggle between physician and insurer; rather, it becomes 
incorporated into the physician’s own clinical decisionmaking process.”53
The goal of actuarial fairness is central to insurance. It requires the accurate pricing of risk, 
so that an insurer charges each group or individual no more and no less in premiums than is 
necessary to cover the cost of future claims, plus administrative expenses and a reasonable 
profit.
  
54 The bedrock philosophy underlying insurance law is to facilitate the achievement of 
actuarial fairness.55
The legal linchpin for actuarial medicine to work is an interpretation of “medically 
necessary” that allows for the consideration of costs in determining appropriate treatment. 
“Medically necessary” is a radically imprecise term which has foundational importance in the 
health care and health law system: it is the measure for whether treatments and services are 
covered by health insurance contracts. But while almost endless variations exist for the meaning 
of this key phrase,
 Health insurance is but one example of actuarial fairness in action (or in 
dispute). 
The downshifting of financial risk in the health care system has produced something new: 
actuarial fairness as a concept within medicine itself. From the provider’s point of view, actuarial 
fairness within medicine means pricing one’s bundle of services so as to produce enough income 
to cover the cost of providing those services to the purchaser’s enrollees for the length of the 
contract, plus overhead and reasonable profit. This is the financial face of managed care as seen 
by the provider, and it is the primary component of actuarial medicine. 
56 what many of them share is an allowance for the consideration of cost. In a 
comprehensive review of statutes and case law, health services research literature, industry 
documents, and trade journals, Rosenbaum et al. concluded that a consensus has emerged that 
“medically necessary” should be defined as “multi-dimensional,” to include factors such as cost 
and relative effectiveness.57
 In my view, “medically necessary” remains the universally used term because, not in 
spite of, the lack of a fixed definition. Its indeterminacy creates a zone in which incommensurate 
values such as cost-benefit analysis and compassion are expected and accommodated, if not 
exactly encouraged. The decisionmaking point can slide along a scale of multiple actors who are 
 This approach essentially ensures that the ultimate measure of what 
will be “medically necessary” will be which treatment option, among those that are reasonably 
believed to be equal in safety and efficacy, costs the least.  
                                                 
53 Kleinke, The Industrialization of Health Care, supra note 4, at 1457. 
54 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 83–89 (1986). 
55 See Karen A. Clifford & Russel P. Iuculano, AIDS and Insurance: The Rationale for AIDS-Related Testing, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1806, 1809–1812 (1987). 
56 A team of researchers from George Washington University reviewing the literature found dozens of different 
definitions in legal and extra-legal sources. See SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
MEDICAL NECESSITY IN PRIVATE HEALTH PLANS: IMPLICATIONS FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CARE 45–63, 66–69 
(2003). In addition to the materials covered by the Rosenbaum study, federal law allows the insurance companies 
that act as fiscal intermediaries or contractors in the Medicare system to define what is medically necessary in 
varying ways. See Timothy P. Blanchard, Medicare Medical Necessity Determinations Revisited: Abuse of 
Discretion and Abuse of Process in the War Against Medicare Fraud and Abuse, 43 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 91, 102 
(1999). State Medicaid programs employ yet additional definitions. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-144 (West 
2007). Yet other definitions emerged from the settlement of a class action brought by physicians who alleged that 
insurers misrepresented their payment policies in violation of RICO. Each of the major insurance companies settled 
on terms that included both definitions of “medically necessary” and special arbitration systems for resolving 
disputes. See, e.g., CAL. MED. ASSOC., HEALTH NET SETTLEMENT OVERVIEW 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.cmanet.org/upload/FinalSettlementOverviewHealthNet.pdf. 
57 ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 56, at 7, 26. 
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involved at different points in treatment and coverage determinations. Risk—both clinical and 
financial—is constantly being negotiated and renegotiated, assumed and shifted, in the 
interactions that identify what counts as medically necessary.  
 
C. THE ARCHITECTURE OF KNOWLEDGES  
 
Risk governance in health care is grounded in the material realities of actuarial medicine that 
I have just described. But the impact of such governance goes beyond simple cost cutting or 
complex new delivery structures. At its heart, and essential to its success, are a set of new 
knowleges created by the health care system.  
Intellectually, the financial side of health care has more than kept pace with the clinical side. 
Health care protocols have shifted from a mindset of responding to unique episodic events 
presented by single patients to a mindset of anticipating certain occurrences with a statistically 
determined regularity, offering insurers and purchasers of large group plans the promise of an 
ability to govern the future.  
Forms of knowledge based on statistical calculation provide the mechanisms by which the 
cost containment reforms described above are able to take hold. New technologies of 
measurement and evaluation that have developed within the health care system now enable the 
aggregation of treatment knowledge based on the systematic reporting of outcomes.58
Experience rating, the pricing of insurance for a given group based on past claims,
 This 
synthesized data produces new knowledge. Larger physician practices and institutional provider 
networks enable the easy aggregation of data, and price competition puts a premium on the 
reliability of such data. 
59 is not 
new. But the standardization of encounter and treatment data fields has enabled a quantum leap 
in the sophistication of predictive models.60 Risk managers use data produced by multiprovider 
networks and institutions to measure and analyze patterns of care,61 and outcomes research has 
become a major field within the medical academy.62
The production of more than 2,000 clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) over roughly the past 
decade
 
63—guidance protocols for physicians to use in deciding upon a course of treatment64—
illustrates how various disciplinary regimes within medicine have evolved together in a 
symbiotic, synergistic fashion in the generation of a discourse of risk managerialism. The 
government,65 the medical profession,66 and private market entities67
                                                 
58 See ROBINSON, CORPORATE PRACTICE, supra note 
 all aligned in their support 
45, at 115. 
59 See, e.g., AARON, supra note 25, at 31–33; ABRAHAM, supra note 54, at 91. 
60 See Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The Courts Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines, 
26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 327, 328 (2001). 
61 See William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the Emerging Managed Health Care System, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 159, 204–05 (Spring 1997). 
62 See J. Rosser Matthews, Practice Guidelines and Tort Reform: The Legal System Confronts the Technocratic 
Wish, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L 275, 279–83 (1999). 
63 See Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical 
Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 417–18 (2002). 
64 The Institute of Medicine defines CPG’s as “systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient 
decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances.” INST. OF MED., COMM. TO ADVISE THE 
PUB. HEALTH SERV. ON CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES, CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW 
PROGRAM 38 (Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1990). 
65 When Congress created the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) in 1987, the agency’s primary 
mission was to use outcomes research to produce national guidelines for common medical procedures. See 
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for the development of CPGs and participated in the development of such guidelines. CPGs are 
an ingenious device for addressing both financial and clinical risk, in essence marrying defensive 
medicine to cost control, rationalized by the discourse of science.68
The process of the institutionalization of CPGs by law is well underway. Courts have begun 
to allow use of CPGs as evidence of the standard of care to which physicians should be held in 
malpractice litigation.
  
69 And although there are differing views among scholars regarding the 
utility of CPGs in determining the outcome of cases,70 litigators are nonetheless using them to 
screen cases.71
Even without any explicit intervention by or interaction with a court, CPGs are effectively 
enforced simply through the contract terms between physicians and payers. They serve a 
disciplinary function through a norming effect. The widespread presence of such guidelines 
creates pressure for physicians to conform to what are promoted as “best” clinical practices.
  
72
In response to various forms of public pressure, insurers have recently loosened the 
strictness of the direct financial incentives placed on physicians.
  
73 At the same time, however, 
the reliance on CPGs has dramatically increased. The percentage of physicians reporting that 
treatment guidelines had a “moderate” to “very large” impact on their practices increased by ten 
points from 1997 to 2001, to 56.2% of all physicians and 60.7% of primary care doctors.74
                                                                                                                                                             
Matthews, supra note 
 As 
62, at 282 . One can now view hundreds of guidelines through the agency’s website. (AHCRP 
was renamed the Agency for Health Research and Quality.) Agency for Health Research and Quality, Clinical 
Practice Guidelines, http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/cpgsix.htm (follow “National Guideline Clearinghouse” hyperlink). 
66 The Institute of Medicine issued a laudatory report on CPGs in 1990, CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES, supra note 
64, and dozens of professional societies have issued their own guidelines. See Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and 
Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 650 
(2001). 
67 For managed care organizations and other insurers, guideline development grew easily out of the methodology of 
utilization review. See Mello, supra note 66, at 651–52. 
68 “[M]odern health plans virtually cannot operate without using some sort of clinical guidelines to decide which 
care is covered under the plan.” E. Haavi Morreim, Playing Doctor: Corporate Medical Practice and Medical 
Malpractice, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 939, 1001 (1999). Gary Belkin argues that only a scientific rationale could 
have succeeded in threading the needle of cost-reduction pressure and professional pride. See Belkin, supra note 4, 
at 518. 
69 A number of courts have allowed a physician to defeat a malpractice claim by demonstrating that she followed the 
professional norm in her treatment decisions; fewer courts have allowed their use by plaintiffs to establish a breach 
of the standard of care. See Andrew L. Hyams et al., Medical Practice Guidelines in Malpractice Litigation: An 
Early Retrospective, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 289, 295–96 (1996); see also Noah, supra note 63, at 462–63.  
70 See, e.g., David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice 
Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 990 (2005) (endorsing judicial 
reliance on CPGs in malpractice litigation); Mello, supra note 66, at 708–10 (opposing); William R. Trail & Brad A. 
Allen, Government Created Medical Practice Guidelines: The Opening of Pandora’s Box, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 231, 
251–58 (1996) (endorsing their use only as an affirmative defense). 
71 Hyams et al., supra note 69, at 292. 
72 See Valverde, Legal Knowledges of Risks, supra note 3, at 93 (describing best-practices guides as “‘normalizing’ 
knowledge formats”). 
73 See Mark A. Hall, The Death of Managed Care: A Regulatory Autopsy, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 427, 441–
43 (2005); Bradley C. Strunk & James D. Reschovsky, Kinder and Gentler: Physicians and Managed Care, 1997–
2001, 5 CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE TRACKING REPORT (Nov. 2002), available at 
http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/486/486.pdf. 
74 Strunk & Reschovsky, supra note 73, at 3–4. 
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with the more obvious financial incentives, the CPGs are likely to induce slower, but perhaps 
more entrenched, norm change over time.75
From the confluence of these economic, technological and intellectual developments, a 
common managerial discourse centered on risk now dominates health care. Increasing 
sophistication of statistics-based technologies of knowledge facilitates risk-allocation decisions 
that are at once both more precise and effective, and less obviously intrusive, than the cruder 
mechanisms of earlier stages of managed care. The distribution of financial risk in the health care 
system, once set and relatively stable (that is, a physician provides the service and gets paid), is 
now continuously evolving. And physicians, care-giving institutions, financers of care, and, 
increasingly, patients
 
76
II. RISK GOVERNANCE AS A PARADIGM FOR HEALTH LAW 
 all participate in these evolving decisions. 
 
 
Law regulates roles and institutions, and new vectors of risk have profoundly changed the 
roles and institutions within medicine. In this section, I return to the perennial “law of the horse” 
problem and argue that understanding health law through the lens of risk governance offers 
greater intellectual coherence for the field than other frameworks that have been suggested. 
Section A provides an overview of the frameworks currently in use for understanding health law 
as a field and makes the case for the greater explanatory power of a risk-governance paradigm. 
Section B offers, as a concrete example of such explanatory power, judicial changes in the 
meaning of “fiduciary” in the health care context.  
 
A. PARADIGMS OF HEALTH LAW 
 
The material forces I describe above have catapulted the field of health law into a state of 
confusion. At a symposium convened in 2005 to “rethink” the field,77 speakers described health 
law as “not yet a coherent field of law . . . . [but] rather, a disjointed set of statutes and 
doctrines,”78 one with “rules [that] come flying from all directions with no one taking the trouble 
to make them consistent,”79 and haunted by “the specter of exhaustion” caused by the recycling 
of two intellectually spent explanatory paradigms: patient autonomy and market theory.80
Efforts to redeem this “substantive cacophony”
  
81 have emerged intermittently since the early 
1980s, when the American Society of Law and Medicine commissioned a task force to review 
the teaching of health law.82
                                                 
75 Cf. Arti K. Rai, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: A Tale of Behavior Induced by Payment Structure, 30 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 579, 583–85 (2001) (explaining the role of financial incentives in changing physician behavior). 
 But none of the explanatory frameworks proposed so far is adequate 
to conceptualize contemporary health care and health law. 
76 Insurers stung by the cost in goodwill from the backlash against managed care increasingly have developed 
product lines that shift elevated levels of financial risk to patient-consumers, through health savings accounts and 
higher co-pays and deductibles. See ROBINSON, CORPORATE PRACTICE, supra note 45, at 83–87. 
77 Mark A. Hall et al., Rethinking Health Law: Introduction, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341 (2006).  
78 Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law? 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 365 (2006). 
79 Carol A. Heimer, Responsibility in Health Care: Spanning the Boundary Between Law and Medicine, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 465, 466 (2006). 
80 Hall et al., supra note 77. 
81 Mark A. Hall, The History and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist View, 41WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 
354 (2006). 
82 See AM. SOC’Y LAW AND MED., HEALTH LAW AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: THE REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE 
ON HEALTH LAW CURRICULA OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF LAW AND MEDICINE (1985). 
Page 15 of 50 
 
The defense of health law as a coherent and independent field has long centered on the 
unique presence of professional authority. For example, the professional custom standard in 
medical malpractice law established a singular rule for tort liability in health care cases.83 In 
other doctrinal categories of law as well, judicial recognition of the particularity of the 
physician’s role has created exceptions to general legal principles, cumulatively forming a zone 
of unique law.84
Health law’s claim to distinctiveness has diminished, however, in light of the growing focus 
on and role of economics in the health care system. From its original core centered on the legal 
oversight of the doctor-patient relationship, health law has grown with its field, becoming a 
complex edifice of heavily statutory law regulating thousands of health-care-related entities.
 Similar to the manner in which family law was understood as founded on a set 
of altered standards for property, tort and contract designed to accommodate the dynamics of 
intimate life experience, health law was understood as resting on, and defined by, a set of 
doctrinal anomalies centered on professional autonomy.  
85 As 
health care has in fact become an industry, at least in scale, issues of economic theory have 
become more urgent, and economics-based approaches to regulation have come to the fore in 
health law, as they have in health policy more generally. Within health law, the zone concerned 
with institutional liability and cost-benefit regulatory issues expanded, as medical practice 
shifted away from dominance by independent professionals to large networks of practitioners 
who contracted with each other and with large institutions to acquire access to larger patient 
markets.86
The most traditional rendition of health law is the “essentialist” view,
  
In light of these changes, academic debate has stalemated about which of three centers of 
gravity best define the core of health law today: the doctor-patient relationship, economics, or 
regulation. No adherent of any theory denies the existence of the forces highlighted by the other 
theories; rather, the debate centers on how to best capture the uniqueness and coherence (if any) 
of health law. In addition, each theory has its own internal conversation that occurs between 
adherents sharing its particular worldview.  
87 centered on the 
“relational web” between provider and patient.88 This approach frames the field as dominated by 
a core of professional authority, including the privilege of self-regulation accorded to physicians 
and the fiduciary duty of physicians towards their patients. The internal conversation within this 
worldview focuses on how the core of professional authority operates synergistically but in 
tension with rights accorded to patient autonomy.89
                                                 
83 See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 195–197 (5th ed. 2004). 
84 See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Henning, 437 S.E.2d 452, 454 (W. Va. 1993) (duty of confidentiality); Stigliano v. 
Connaught Laboratories, Inc., 658 A.2d 715, 720 (N.J. 1995) (duty to testify about treatment rendered to patient). 
85 See Barry R. Furrow, From the Doctor to the System: The New Demands of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 67, 
69–80 (2004). 
86 See Jeffery Boyd & Lauren Kelley, Health Law 2000: Regulation, Litigation, or Stagnation?, 15 HEALTH AFF. 31, 
33 (1996). 
  
87 Hall, supra note 81, at 357–62.  
88 Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Where Is the “There” in Health Law? Can It Become a Coherent Field?, 14 
HEALTH MATRIX 101, 103 (2004). 
89 See generally CARL SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND MEDICAL DECISIONS 9–
32 (1998); Janet L. Dolgin, The Evolution of the “Patient”: Shifts in Attitudes About Consent, Genetic Information, 
and Commercialization in Health Care, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 137 (2005). 
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The second candidate for intellectual dominance is the economics approach that emphasizes 
the role of health law in facilitating private market forces.90 This approach centers on the unique 
economic dynamics of the health care market, bedeviled by highly asymmetric information 
resources, a history of supplier-induced demand, and the fact that many consumers of care 
(particularly individuals in large group plans) are not the primary payers for that care.91 Critics 
counter the economics-centered worldview by invoking physicians’ professional norms of 
compassion and rescue to counter a solely economic analysis.92
A third approach views health law as a form of regulatory law, focusing on the role of the 
state in balancing the tension between the need for broader access to health care and the need to 
control costs.
  
93 While this is similar to the regulatory law applicable to most economic sectors 
that mediate a power struggle between the state and the market, the internal conversation within 
this worldview centers on two dynamics that distinguish the regulatory landscape of health care. 
First, health regulation represents a struggle among three centers of power, as opposed to the 
normal dichotomous power contest between the state and entities in the private market. The third 
player—the profession—retains some degree of self-regulatory leeway, and allies itself 
sometimes with the regulators, sometimes with market entities.94 Second, there is deep social 
ambivalence about whether health care should be considered a public good or a commodity.95
One response to the scholarly stalemate seeks a legal process kind of solution—focusing on 
institutional competence and drawing on different frameworks for different problems.
 As 
a result, there are only provisional and unstable resolutions of political questions about how 
much access should be guaranteed by public mechanisms.  
 None of these paradigms, however, can claim dominance as a satisfactory rationale for 
health law as a coherent field. Placing any one of them at the center of a concept of health law 
today omits too much of what constitutes the core of legal regulation of the health care system. A 
distinctive tort liability standard and the (diminishing) scope of autonomous self-regulation that 
furnish much of the basis for the essentialist view provide us with little insight into insurance or 
financial risk questions in health law. Market-oriented perspectives centered in antitrust, tax law, 
and the analysis of financial incentive structures as market interventions discount the doctor-
patient relationship and equity questions. Focusing on federal and state regulation of health care 
misses many of the private investment and liability issues. 
96 A major 
proponent of this approach, Einer Elhauge, has argued for a “comparative paradigm analysis”97 
through which certain decisions would be effectively assigned to different systems. For example, 
establishing a national budget for health care costs might be best decided through laws resulting 
from the political and regulatory process, while ensuring competitive service suppliers for 
consumers might be best achieved through laws that facilitate market forces.98
                                                 
90 See generally CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF 
HEALTH CARE REFORM (1995). 
91 See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AMER. ECON. REV. 
941 (1963). 
92 See M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 247, 303 (2003). 
93 See generally Rand E. Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A Structural Approach, 88 YALE 
L. J. 243 (1990). 
94 See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982). 
95 See generally NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985). 
 But this approach 
96 See Elhauge, supra note 78. 
97 Id. at 379. 
98 See id. at 384–86. 
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essentially consists of a decisionmaking heuristic that might be applied in any number of fields. 
It does not purport to offer a comprehensive intellectual framework for understanding health law. 
My argument is that the best way to understand health law is to focus not on the tension 
between the three centers of power comprised of the state, the market and the profession, but 
rather on the extraordinarily complex synchronicity among these three centers. And at the heart 
of this synchronicity lie decisions about risk.  
Health care delivery systems, financing and payment structures, and bureaucracies of 
government regulating all aspects of health care together comprise a set of unrelated, but 
nonetheless deeply connected, public and private institutions of collective risk allocation and 
management. Understanding health law as a discourse that reacts to and facilitates the flow of 
practices and policies that address financial risk, and how it interacts with clinical risk, offers us 
a more holistic and integrated approach to the field. Moreover, a focus on risk suggests a path 
around the traditional division in legal doctrine between public and private realms, which has 
obscured the matrix of how power actually flows within the health care system.99
Informed consent doctrine provides one example of how a focus on concepts of risk knits 
together disparate structures within the health care system in a holistic manner. Informed consent 
law began as an anti-paternalism mechanism, using tort doctrine to remedy the power 
inequalities in the doctor-patient relationship by forcing disclosure of information about clinical 
risk material to the patient’s decisionmaking.
  
100
But informed consent law today is also being looked to as a possible means for addressing 
information asymmetries with regard to how doctors manage their financial risks. For example, 
informed consent law is currently grappling with when and by whom patients should be 
informed of the financial incentives that affect almost every physician’s compensation.
  
101 
Performance data about individual doctors and hospitals could conceivably be incorporated into 
the consent process as well.102 Patient advocacy groups are seeking access to the Medicare 
database that contains detailed billing information from thousands of providers in order to 
publish performance evaluations of those physicians.103
                                                 
99 See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1992) (finding no state action when the decision of a private nursing 
home had the effect of reclassifying level of Medicaid services); see also Clyde W. Summers, The Privatization of 
Personal Freedoms and Enrichment of Democracy: Some Lessons from Labor Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 689. 
100 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed 
Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 267–68 (1999). 
  
In my view, the best way to view these developments in informed consent law is through a 
risk-governance lens that forces us to focus on how the state, the private market, and the 
profession are all operating in a system for the allocation and management of clinical and 
financial risk. 
101 Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1997) (ERISA fiduciary duty includes obligation to disclose 
financial incentive when advising patient not to seek specialist care). In many states, statutes impose disclosure 
requirements on health plans. See Tracy E. Miller & William M. Sage, Disclosing Physician Financial Incentives, 
281 JAMA 1424, 1427 & n.33 (1999); see also, e.g., Neade v. Portes, 303 Ill. App. 3d 799, 808–12 (1999). See 
generally Bloche, supra note 92, at 271–74; Krause, supra note 100, at 346–61; David Mechanic & Mark 
Schlesinger, The Impact of Managed Care on Patients’ Trust in Medical Care and Their Physicians, 275 JAMA 
1693, 1694 (1996). 
102 See Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996) (holding surgeon liable in part for not informing patient 
that he had not previously performed the procedure to which the patient consented); see also Aaron D. Twerski & 
Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed Consent: Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1 (1999). 
103 See Consumers Checkbook v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 502 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D.D.C. 2007). 
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 One can argue that using a risk-governance approach to health law will render the field 
less distinctive, thus threatening whatever sense of intellectual coherence it can still muster. 
However, only the traditional professional-autonomy model proffers a claim for the uniqueness 
of health law. The others, like the risk-governance paradigm, focus on doctrines that have 
remained tailored to health care, but not unique to it. In my view, a risk-governance model is a 
superior analytic tool because it provides us with more fully theorized and contemporarily 
relevant insights into the operations of the health care system.  
 Another advantage of the risk-governance paradigm is that it can significantly bridge the 
gap between the traditionally private law of health care financing and delivery and the 
traditionally public law of the public health system. Public health principles are founded on an 
orientation to population health, rather than individual patient care.104
The same potential for transcending conceptual boundaries lies in bringing a risk-
governance approach to comparative health law. The American health care system is often 
characterized in ways that highlight its singularity, particularly in its financing mechanisms and 
its under-inclusiveness.
 The law governing the 
doctor-patient relationship, by contrast, is about individual patient care. But both “bedside 
rationing” by doctors dealing with the merger of financial and clinical risk and the allocation of 
public dollars for population health increasingly turn on broad distributive questions. Mapping 
the dynamics of financial risk in both systems can offer the possibility of greater coherence 
between the two. 
105 Yet, multiple national systems are grappling with how to meld 
processes for coverage determinations with quantitative models for budgeting and risk 
assessment.106
B. THE COLONIZATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY BY RISK GOVERNANCE 
 Whatever the differences in the structures of various national systems, American 
and other health officials are encountering many of the same cross-cutting issues related to 
financial management—a shared concern best highlighted by a risk-governance approach. 
 
 
The new patterns of risk assumption within health care that I describe in the Introduction 
have introduced instability into the legal concept of fiduciary duty. The colonization of fiduciary 
duty by risk governance provides an example of how understanding health law through the lens 
of risk governance can help bring clarity and coherence to doctrinal developments in the field.  
A physician’s fiduciary duty to place the interests of her patients above all other concerns 
has long been an article of faith within the medical profession.107 Its origins lay in the 
Hippocratic Oath’s injunction that physicians shall enter houses only for the benefit of the ill, 
and not for personal gain, and it is reflected today also in the Declaration of Geneva and the 
ethics code of the British General Medical Council.108 A fiduciary duty has also long been 
present in tort and contract principles in traditional health law.109
                                                 
104 LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 3–5 (2000). 
105 See JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR 
BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2002) [hereinafter HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE]. 
106 See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 1–5 (2005). 
 
107 See, e.g., Jerome P. Kassirer, Managing Care—Should We Adopt a New Ethic?, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 397, 398 
(1998). See generally JACOBSON, supra note 36, at 222–25. 
108 See National Library of Medicine, The Hippocratic Oath, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek_oath.html 
(last visited May 25, 2008); see also Wikipedia.org, Declaration of Geneva, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declaration_of_Geneva (“The health ... of my patient will be my first consideration”) 
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But, in actuarial medicine today, a physician’s fiduciary duty has essentially been ERISA-
fied. ERISA is the statute that effectively regulates private sector health insurance.110 ERISA 
does not explicitly dictate that a treating physician should interpret her fiduciary duty in a 
managed care setting differently than she did in a fee-for-service system. The judicial 
interpretation of the responsibility established by ERISA for both the sponsor and the insurer of a 
group plan have in effect trumped the purely medical concept of fiduciary duty111
ERISA establishes fiduciary responsibilities for the persons or entities charged with the 
oversight and administration of an employee benefit plan.
—hence 
resulting in what I call the colonization of fiduciary duty by risk governance. 
112 The ERISA fiduciary concept draws 
primarily on the principle from trust law that a trustee has a duty of loyalty to administer a trust 
solely for the benefit of the beneficiaries.113 Trust fiduciary duty attaches to the fund itself, and 
requires that the trustee exercise prudence in approving and rejecting any claims made on the 
fund.114 The trustee’s duty is to manage the fund in such a way that all of the beneficiaries will 
be able to share its benefits, not to direct that each beneficiary will necessarily receive the 
maximum she seeks from the trust.115
The primary motivation for ERISA was to provide new rules for the solvency, disclosure 
policies, vesting rules, and administration of pension plans.
 
116 In this context, the traditional duty 
of a trust fiduciary works relatively well. But because ERISA regulates “welfare” plans 
generally, it also governs plans providing health benefits.117
The result is a health law doctrine created by the Supreme Court that accommodates the 
realities of these merged identities on the part of providers and these dueling interests on the part 
 In this context, the fiduciary 
relationship has become more complicated. As noted above, health care providers often manage 
both clinical and financial risk in an integrated fashion, and employers sponsoring health care 
plans want dual, sometime contradictory goals—to provide health care benefits to their 
employees but also to control costs through managed care frameworks.  
                                                                                                                                                             
(last visited May 25, 2008); General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (2006), http://www.gmc-
uk.org/guidance/good_medical_practice/duties_of_a_doctor.asp (“Make the care of your patient your first concern”) 
(last visited May 25, 2008). 
109 See supra note 84; see also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 466, 469 (Cal. 1990); Mary Anne 
Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from Their Physicians, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 349 n.211 
(1994). Courts will sometimes simply make flat statements that a fiduciary duty exists between physician and 
patient, indicative of a kind of judicial notice of the fiduciary relationship, without requiring evidence or citing to 
authority. See, e.g., Lockett v. Goodill, 430 P.2d 589, 591 (Wash. 1967). Marc Rodwin has argued that the concept 
of doctors as fiduciaries for their patients is “a dominant metaphor” in health law, but that courts enforce it in only 
limited circumstances. See Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and 
Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 242 (1995). 
110 ERISA governs all employee benefit plans in the private sector including health insurance as well as pensions. 
See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000). For a history of how it evolved to become such a critical component of health law, 
see infra notes 148–162. 
111 “ERISA’s fiduciary duty provisions do not readily accommodate the professional norm of fidelity to individual 
patients.” M. Gregg Bloche & Peter D. Jacobson, The Supreme Court and Bedside Rationing, 284 JAMA 2776, 
2778 (2000). 
112 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2000). 
113 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2000); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110–11 
(1989). 
114 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., 3 SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 17.8, at 1215–1220 (2006). 
115 Id. § 17.15, at 1257–62. 
116 See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981) (finding that Congress was concerned with 
workers actually receiving rights which had vested). 
117 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000). 
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of employers. Two cases decided within four years of each other demonstrate the twisting road 
taken by the Supreme Court to accommodate risk-governance practices in health care.  
In Pegram v. Herdich,118 the Supreme Court faced a complex situation involving a 
defendant doctor who co-owned the HMO where she also worked as a treating physician. The 
doctor, Lori Pegram, found an inflamed mass in Cynthia Herdrich’s abdomen. Despite the 
inflammation, Pegram chose not to order an ultrasound for Herdrich at a local hospital, but 
concluded instead that Herdrich could wait eight days for an ultrasound to be performed at a 
facility staffed by the HMO itself, fifty miles away. Before the eight days were over, Herdrich’s 
appendix ruptured, causing peritonitis.119
Herdrich sued Pegram and the HMO for medical malpractice and state law fraud.
 
120 Pegram 
and the HMO responded by arguing that ERISA preempted those claims and removed the case to 
federal court. Herdrich then asserted her own ERISA claim by arguing that Pegram and the 
HMO violated their fiduciary duties under ERISA. Her theory was that the terms of the HMO 
rewarded its physician owners for limiting medical care, and thus “created an incentive to make 
decisions in the physicians’ self-interest, rather than the exclusive interests of plan 
participants.”121
The sole legal question before the Supreme Court was “whether treatment decisions made 
by a health maintenance organization, acting through its physician employees, are fiduciary acts 
within the meaning of [ERISA.]”
  
122 The Court concluded they were not.123
The Court ruled that an HMO’s fiduciary duty under ERISA applied only to coverage 
decisions regarding benefits to be provided under a plan.
 
124 By contrast, the Court declared that a 
doctor’s decision to delay a diagnostic test in order for it to be performed by a facility affiliated 
with the HMO was a “mixed treatment-eligibility decision” and that such decisions were not 
covered under ERISA’s fiduciary duty.125
 The Court’s decision in Pegram reads like a policy treatise on health care. It explains in 
depth the cost-benefit balancing process that occurs in health care today. The Court compared 
 
                                                 
118 Pegram v. Herdich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).  
119 Id. at 215. 
120 Plaintiff’s first strategy was to plead only state law claims and avoid ERISA, doubtless because of the very 
limited remedies available under ERISA. There are no provisions for economic or non-economic damages in 
ERISA, only a right to restitution of the benefit. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000 & Supp. 2005).  
121 Pegram, 530 U.S. at 216. The plaintiff, Cynthia Herdrich, had coverage with the HMO through her husband’s 
employer. The HMO had contracted with the employer who sponsored the group health plan to both provide 
medical services and administer the group plan. Thus, the HMO was responsible for assessing whether particular 
services were covered under a medically necessary standard, as well as for delivering the care. The patient alleged 
that the assessment regarding the exigency of her need for a diagnostic test was tainted by the physician’s awareness 
that her own year-end bonus would be based on how successfully she reduced expenditures by, in part, directing that 
auxiliary services such as testing be performed by the in-network facilities which charged reduced rates. Id. at 226–
27. 
122 Id. at 214. 
123 Id. The district court had concluded that Pegram and the HMO were not acting as fiduciaries under ERISA and 
dismissed the ERISA claim. Herdrich was then permitted to try her original malpractice counts to a jury, where she 
prevailed on both and received $35,000 in compensation. Herdrich then appealed the dismissal of the ERISA claim 
to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which concluded that Herdrich’s allegations were sufficient to state 
a claim under ERISA. Id. at 217. 
124 Id. at 237. 
125 Id. at 211, 237. The Court suggested that physicians could still be held individually liable on common law 
grounds if their standard of care, including their clinical assessment of what was medically necessary, fell below the 
professional norm standard for malpractice. Id. at 224. 
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HMOs to other risk bearing entities, such as traditional insurers,126 and stated that for any HMO 
structure, “there must be rationing and inducement to ration.”127 The Court observed that, under 
the plaintiff’s theory, the mere existence of such a scheme would constitute a breach of ERISA 
fiduciary duty and the ultimate result “would be nothing less than elimination of the for-profit 
HMO.”128
Regarding physicians, the Court noted that “the incentive of the HMO physician . . . to give 
treatment sparingly” cannot be easily overcome.
 
129 The Court hypothesized that were it to 
recognize mixed treatment-eligibility decisions as covered by ERISA’s fiduciary duty 
requirements, a physician’s obvious defense to a charge of violating such duty would be that the 
decision had been justified by good medical reasons.130 But this, the Court explained, would turn 
ERISA fiduciary claims into simple malpractice disputes that would be resolved on the 
malpractice standard of “reasonable and customary medical practice in like circumstances.”131 
Allowing such claims would be wasteful and unnecessary as simply duplicative of medical 
malpractice claims.132
What the Court achieved in this analytical move, albeit completely without 
acknowledgement, was to signal the erasure of the medical fiduciary standard as an independent, 
viable standard for physicians in managed care settings. Under a traditional medical fiduciary 
standard, a physician makes treatment decisions based solely on the best interests of the 
particular patient; she does not properly consider rationing concerns.
 
133 In its place, the Court 
retained only the medical malpractice standard, which considers whether a physician’s treatment 
decision is consistent with reasonable and customary medical practice standards.134
By contrast, the traditional medical fiduciary duty does conflict with this kind of cost-benefit 
analysis or the favoring of personal gain. The net effect is that the trust concept as incorporated 
in ERISA, under which a duty of stewardship attaches to a collective (insurance) fund, has 
become the new version of medical fiduciary duty.
  
The difference between the two standards is that a medical malpractice standard is not 
intrinsically in conflict with a doctor’s concern about either her own income or cost-benefit 
calculations as to an insurance fund. Under reasonable and customary medical practice standards 
today, treating physicians could opt for the least expensive choice among what can reasonably be 
expected to be equally effective regimens.  
135
                                                 
126 Id. at 219. 
127 Id. at 221. 
128 Id. at 232–33. The Court declined to undertake an assessment of whether the structure of the defendant’s 
financial inducements system exceeded “socially acceptable medical risk,” id. at 221, because that judgment would 
require determination of the appropriate trade-offs between the risk of under-treatment and the amount of 
expenditures to be allocated for health care, see id. Such an analysis, the Court said, was for the legislature to make. 
See id. 
129 Id. at 234–35. 
130 See id. at 235. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 See Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: Self-Regulation in the Medical Marketplace, 66 MO. L. 
REV. 341, 359–62 (2001) (distinguishing between an allowance for some consideration of the expense of different 
treatments and allocating resources across populations). 
  
134 For a similar argument as to the distinction between fiduciary and malpractice standards in the context of 
informed consent law, see Bobinski, supra note 109, at 343–44. 
135 Cf. William M. Sage, UR Here: The Supreme Court’s Guide for Managed Care, 19 HEALTH AFF. 219, 222 
(2000) (characterizing the Court’s decision in Pegram as “render[ing] irrelevant” the distinction between ERISA’s 
duty of loyalty and the professional standard for physician loyalty to a patient’s interest). 
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This result may well constitute acceptable health policy. My point is not to contest or 
analyze its utility as policy. Rather, it is simply to highlight how the Court’s legal conclusion 
regarding fiduciary duty under ERISA was shaped by the reality of risk governance in health 
care today. As reflected in and implicitly consolidated by the Court’s Pegram decision, the 
medical fiduciary duty for physicians who practice in systems with financial incentives—now a 
majority of American doctors—has changed in substance if not in semantics. That duty now 
operates in tandem with, not as a prohibition on, concerns related to forms of financial risk that 
could create a significant drain on an insurance fund and negatively affect the physician’s 
income.  
The Court implicitly reaffirmed the primacy of risk governance in shaping health law 
doctrine in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila.136 There, plaintiffs sued a MCO for denying approval of 
various treatment recommendations that their physicians, who would be reimbursed by the 
MCO, had made.137 The plaintiffs sued the MCO under a Texas statute that created tort liability 
for the failure to exercise “‘ordinary care in making health care treatment decisions.’”138
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the MCO’s denials of authorization for assertedly medically 
necessary services were “‘mixed eligibility and treatment decisions’” and hence, pursuant to 
Pegram, were not fiduciary decisions covered by ERISA.
  
139 On that reasoning, the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that the state law claim was not preempted by ERISA and could proceed.140
The Supreme Court reversed.
 
141 The Court explained that mixed treatment and eligibility 
decisions fell outside the definition of coverage decisions governed by ERISA’s fiduciary duty 
only when such decisions were made by the treating physician, as had occurred in Pegram. That 
is, a decision about whether a treatment was medically necessary would be considered a medical 
decision for purposes of liability only if made by a treating physician. When made by MCO 
reviewing staff, as in Davila, such a decision would be treated as a coverage decision subject to 
ERISA standards.142
The logic of the Court’s analysis subordinated medical judgment to resource allocation. The 
Court noted that “a trustee managing a medical trust undoubtedly must make administrative 
decisions that require the exercise of medical judgment.”
 
The Court’s reasoning made it clear that it did not consider the mixed decisions made by the 
MCO reviewers to be any less medical in nature; they were clearly assessments of the medical 
necessity of care needed for a specific individual with a particular condition. But in a highly 
formalistic move, the Court concluded that the coverage function of the decision simply trumped 
the medical nature of the decision, even though the effect of the coverage decision was to deny 
care.  
143
                                                 
136 Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004). 
137 Id. at 204–05. Davila consolidated cases involving denial of a specific medication recommended by a treating 
physician but for which the MCO denied approval, and denial of additional in-patient time, also recommended by 
the plaintiff’s personal physician. In both instances, the MCO decisions allegedly caused illness that would have 
been averted had the original recommendations been accepted. See id. 
138 Id. at 205 (describing claims under the Texas Health Care Liability Act). 
139 See id. at 206. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. at 204. 
 The opinion in Davila frames 
decisions about medical necessity as requiring no different process than that for decisions about 
142 The practical ramification of this classification was the sharp curtailment of potential relief for plaintiffs. See 
supra note 120.  
143 Id. at 219. 
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pensions or vacation pay—other benefits governed by the ERISA structure. “[B]enefits 
determinations involving medical judgments are, just as much as any other benefits 
determinations, actions by plan fiduciaries.”144 This includes “even determinations based 
extensively on medical judgments.”145
III. THE STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 
 The Court’s reasoning creates a hierarchy of expertise, in 
which medical knowledge is but one factor in the larger project of conserving fund assets.  
To summarize, the Court’s dicta in Pegram accurately captures the “bedside rationing” 
reality of today’s care, in which the medical fiduciary duty has melded with the ERISA standard 
for fiduciary duty, leaving only the medical malpractice standard to police conduct. Pegram 
normalized actuarial medicine by describing treatment decisions, correctly, as routinely 
incorporating financial considerations. In Davila, the Court ruled that the law governing risk 
distribution—that is, insurance law—preempted any other legal remedy for failure to act 
reasonably in making the medical/coverage decision. In other words, the financial stability 
concerns animating ERISA preemption trumped.  
The important aspect of these decisions is not the particular doctrine they have generated 
under ERISA. Rather, my purpose in examining these cases has been to demonstrate the 
assumptions they reveal about the appropriate nature of medical practice and the dynamic 
relationship between financial and clinical risk concerns in the health care system.  
 These decisions illustrate that the defining characteristic of health law is no longer 
professional autonomy, but rather a tripartite structure of risk regulation that is often hidden by 
its private contractual delegation to providers. Doctors act as insurers because they often are 
insurers. The most powerfully explanatory blueprint of roles within the health care system today 
reveals an architecture based on the assumption of financial risk.  
 
 
 In the Introduction of this Article, I made the claim for understanding risk governance as 
dominating health care today, with the concomitant rise of actuarial medicine. In Part I of the 
Article, I argued that conceptualizing health law as responding to and facilitating risk governance 
in health care offers us the most coherent framework for understanding health law as a 
meaningful field. 
In this Part, I seek to demonstrate how the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the preemption 
provisions of ERISA, the primary statute that directly channels private health insurance risk in 
the United States, has been influenced by considerations of risk governance. In section A, I 
explain the motivations for and development of ERISA, including the small governmental 
regulatory role that the law originally anticipated. I then offer an historical reading of ERISA that 
is largely absent from both judicial and scholarly treatments of the law—that ERISA’s policy 
preference for a small governmental regulatory role was premised on the background knowledge 
that joint labor-management sovereignty dominated the process for constructing health insurance 
plans through collective bargaining agreements in various employment settings. As we now 
know, the assumption that such a state of affairs would continue has proven not to be true, given 
the sharp decrease in union membership levels.  
In section B, I describe how the Supreme Court’s interpretations of ERISA’s explicit and 
implicit preemption components have shifted the law’s initial model of joint labor-management 
sovereignty to virtually complete management sovereignty—what I term “corporate federalism” 
                                                 
144 Id. at 220. 
145 Id. 
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in private health insurance. I explain how this shift can be best understood using the lens of risk-
governance analysis. 
Finally, in section C, I defend the original concept behind Congress’ decision to devolve 
power to the workplace level through ERISA’s structure. Contrary to the dominant view in 
scholarly analysis of ERISA’s preemption doctrine, I argue that future health care reform efforts 
should leave such preemption in place. In doing so, I offer a partial defense of workplace 
federalism. These arguments establish the foundation for my normative proposal, in Part IV, in 
which I call for democracy-enhancing governance reforms in workplace risk pools for so long as 
health insurance is tied to employment. My proposal in Part IV could be revised to achieve the 
same goal of deliberative democracy in health care were the United States to shift away from 
employer-sponsored plans and towards a single-payer system. 
 
A. ERISA: THE PREQUEL 
 
 In 1946, six years before the steel mill seizure that triggered the constitutional crisis 
resolved in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,146 President Truman seized the coal mines 
to prevent a national strike over health insurance benefits.147 During the postwar period, worker 
demand for health insurance coverage, which had abated during a wartime no-strike pledge by 
unions, surged back to the forefront of domestic issues.148 Campaigns for health coverage that 
had been preserved, or sometimes expanded, by governmental action during the war149 spread 
rapidly through the economy when the war ended.150
The ideological drive to incorporate health insurance into the workplace harmonized with 
the “industrial self-government” paradigm that dominated labor law at the time.
  
151
                                                 
146 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
147 Unlike the 1952 steel mill seizure, Truman in 1946 had statutory power under the War Labor Disputes Act 
(which expired in 1947) to take this action. See RAYMOND MUNTS, BARGAINING FOR HEALTH: LABOR UNIONS, 
HEALTH INSURANCE AND MEDICAL CARE 33 (1967). 
148 See JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICA’S PUBLIC-
PRIVATE WELFARE STATE 178, 213–17 (2003). 
 Under this 
paradigm, workplaces were viewed as highly self-contained, largely independent zones, with 
powers analogous to those of sovereign entities. The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was 
viewed by sympathetic courts and agency officials as the constitution for the workplace: within 
the terms set by federal labor statutes, unions and management would negotiate a mutually 
149 After Truman seized the mines, the Secretary of the Interior signed an agreement with the president of the United 
Mineworkers Workers (UMW) that included establishment of funding for health benefits. When operating control 
was returned to the owners, the health benefits system was continued and management’s funding for it increased. 
See KLEIN, supra note 148, at 198; MUNTS, supra note 147, at 33. For a discussion of the UMW’s efforts after 1946, 
see MUNTS, supra note 147, at 29–47. 
150 The number of individuals with health insurance through their workplaces rose from 2.7 million in 1948 to more 
than 7 million in 1950. See JOSEPH W. GARBARINO, HEALTH PLANS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 19 (1960). 
151 See Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960) (describing labor-management 
relations as a “system of industrial self-government”). See generally Katherine van Wezel Stone, The Post-War 
Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1511–15 (1981). The Supreme Court cleared the field for 
health insurance to be part of the demands made within a system of industrial self-government when it left standing 
a court of appeals decision ruling that benefit plans fell within the “conditions of employment” subject to collective 
bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act. Inland Steel Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 170 F.2d 247, 
250–51, 254–55 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949). The Supreme Court’s denial of review 
effectively killed further litigation by employers arguing that health insurance benefits were not within the scope of 
collective bargaining. See KLEIN, supra note 148, at 231–32. 
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agreed upon charter for the governance of their world of employment.152 The infrastructure and 
rules of arbitration created by the CBAs substituted for the infrastructure and rules of the 
judiciary that existed in the parallel traditional governmental state.153
Under this industrial self-government paradigm, balancing the trade-offs between who 
would have access to health care and how the costs of such care would be covered fell within the 
scope of labor-management negotiation. The results of those negotiations were then filtered 
through private insurance markets. In line with the concept of the workplace as a parallel quasi-
government, unions initially framed the cost of health benefits as a form of a “tax” to be paid by 
employers.
  
154 As Paul Starr has noted, this metaphor provided the basis for persuading Congress 
to enact a tax exemption in 1954 for employer contributions to health insurance, on the argument 
that treating such contributions as taxable income would amount to “double taxation” on the 
employer.155
 By the 1950s, the extent to which “fringe” benefits, such as health insurance, had gained 
in importance compared to wages amounted to “something close to a revolution” for industrial 
relations.
 The tax exemption for employee health benefits thus not only created a fiscal 
incentive for employers to offer health insurance plan to employees, thus tethering health 
insurance to the workplace, but it also implicitly acknowledged how deeply the concept of 
workplace self-government was built into federal law. 
156 Unions and employers fought over who would sponsor the health insurance plans. 
Employers saw advantages in seizing “the moral high ground” by initiating insurance benefits.157 
When the United Auto Workers (UAW) sought a jointly-controlled health benefits plan in 1947, 
General Motors refused on the ground that health insurance should be considered solely a 
management prerogative.158
Regardless of who sponsored the health plans, many union leaders believed that providing 
such plans for workers was advantageous for unions because it created a powerful bond between 
a union and its members. This was either because the union sponsored the plan itself (as several 
unions did)
  
 159 or because the union would get credit for securing the benefit for its members 
from the employer.160
                                                 
152 The CBA functioned as “essentially an instrument of government.” Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon Labor 
Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1492 (1959).  
153 See id. 
 In 1957, twenty-five percent of employees with health insurance were 
154 GARBARINO, supra note 150, at 22; MUNTS, supra note 147, at 33–35, 51. 
155 STARR, supra note 94, at 334. Classifying health benefits as not part of compensation began as a temporary 
measure during World War II when wage controls were in effect. See FIELD, supra note 13, at 77–78. 
156 GARBARINO, supra note 150, at 1–2. 
157 KLEIN, supra note 148, at 220; see also MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE SHADOW WELFARE STATE: LABOR, BUSINESS, 
AND THE POLITICS OF HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 48 (2000); KLEIN, supra note 148, at 210–11, 221–23, 
and 239–40.  
158 See Alan Derickson, Health Security for All? Social Unionism and Universal Health Insurance, 80 J. AMER. 
HISTORY 1333, 1350 (1994). 
159 See KLEIN, supra note 148, at 188. In a number of industries, unions still sponsor and administer the health 
insurance plans. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 157, at 44–53. In those instances, it is union-selected agents that are 
responsible for resolving disputes when a worker asserts that she was improperly denied coverage of a medical 
service recommended by her physician. See, e.g., Jones v. Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 906 F.2d 480 (9th 
Cir. 1990), upholding denial by the union fund of a claim on the ground that the treatment sought was not medically 
necessary: “The language of the collective bargaining agreement provides the means by which the Trust Fund 
operates. . . . We will not upset the review process the parties have bargained for.” Id. at 482. 
160 Union leaders believed that the plans provided “an important sense of identity and cohesion for union members 
who may have few other real attachments.” GOTTSCHALK, supra note 157, at 52; see also id. at 42–44, 51. Klein 
describes a UMW program that transported injured workers from the mines to prestigious hospitals as creating 
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enrolled in a plan over which their union exercised some degree of control.161 As a result, union 
political support for a government-centered, national health coverage system diminished.162
 Tensions arose between management and labor with regard to whether an employer-
sponsored plan had a duty to share fiscal information with the union.
 
163 In addition, instances of 
financial abuses by both labor and management of increasingly hefty health insurance and 
pension funds arose.164 Congress responded with the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act 
in 1958.165 As even greater portions of overall employee compensation continued to pour into 
benefits, however, political demands grew for a more systematic and thorough policing of the 
funds.166
 The capstone to this reform movement was the enactment of ERISA.
 
167 ERISA was very 
much a product of its time, considered to be an enormous political victory on behalf of ordinary 
workers, in sync with the major civil rights statutes of the 1960s.168 Labor unions joined with 
business interests to support its enactment, largely because of the strength of their shared desire 
to avoid state regulation.169 According to James Wooten, the effect was so profound that 
“preemption issues created the coalition that pushed ERISA through Congress.”170
Unfortunately, the law was founded on three assumptions that all evaporated within a 
decade. First, unionism was still a viable movement in 1974; the sharp plummet in union 
membership occurred in the 1980s,
 
171 and today has reached a low-water mark of 7.4% of 
private industry workers.172 Second, health care costs were still relatively modest in 1974; the 
upward spike of medical sector inflation was imminent, but had not yet occurred.173
                                                                                                                                                             
dramatic scenes that carried the message that “the union would take care of its own.” KLEIN, supra note 
 Third, 
148, at 197–
99. 
161 See GARBARINO, supra note 150, at 7, 19. 
162 See Derickson, supra note 158, at 1356. 
163 See KLEIN, supra note 148, at 224–26, 237. 
164 See id. at 247; MUNTS, supra note 147, at 107–08. 
165 72 Stat. 997, 999–1000 (repealed 1976); see also KLEIN, supra note 148, at 250–53; JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE 
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 45–49, 81–83 (2004). 
166 The single most powerful triggering event mobilizing demand for further reform was the default of the 
Studebaker-Packard Pension Plan in the early 1960s. See WOOTEN, supra note 165, at 51–79. 
167 “ERISA represented the culmination of the disclosure act struggle. . . .” KLEIN, supra note 148, at 261. 
168 One of the prime congressional supporters of ERISA, Senator Jacob Javits, called it “the greatest development in 
the life of the American worker since social security.” See WOOTEN, supra note 165, at 1. President Ford scheduled 
the signing ceremony for Labor Day, to highlight its “really . . . historic” importance. See id.  
169 See WOOTEN, supra note 165, at 7–8; Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Semi-Preemption in ERISA: 
Legislative Process and Health Policy, 7 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 47, 51 (1988); James A. Wooten, A Legislative and 
Political History of ERISA Preemption, Part 2, 14 J. PENSION BENEFITS 5, 10 (2007). Pro-union advocates routinely 
sought to reinforce federal power: Archibald Cox noted in 1954 that “[l]abor union lawyers are the strongest 
advocates of federal preemption, both in court and before congressional committees.” Archibald Cox, Federalism 
and the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1297, 1302 (1954). Catherine Fisk suggested that “some in 
Congress may have believed that making employee benefits an area of exclusive federal concern [through ERISA 
preemption] was merely the first part of a new phase in the construction of the American welfare state.” Catherine L. 
Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Contract in the Federal Common Law of Employee 
Benefits, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 153, 163 (1995). 
170 Wooten, A Legislative and Political History, supra note 165, at 10 (emphasis added). 
171 Katherine Van Wetzel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment 
Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 579 (1992). 
172 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members in 2006, at 1 (Jan. 2007), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. 
173 See supra text accompanying notes 25–28. 
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contingent on the first two, it was still plausible in 1974 to imagine that non-union employers 
would compete for labor by seeking to match the health insurance benefits negotiated by unions, 
so that the overall trend would be a ratcheting-up of health benefits for all employees.174
As we now well know, global labor competition soon turned the tables, so that massively 
expensive health benefits have become the albatross of employers.
  
175 Health insurance terms of 
coverage have become a frequent source of give-backs in labor negotiations,176 employer 
sponsorship of health insurance plans has decreased rather than increased,177 and, in a deeply 
ironic twist on history, GM has offloaded a portion of its health insurance benefits obligation to 
the UAW.178
B. THE INVENTION OF CORPORATE FEDERALISM 
 
Supreme Court decisions interpreting provisions of ERISA premised on these assumptions 
have been blind to how those assumptions have changed. The Court has rigidly adhered to 
provisions that were based on principles intended to insulate collective bargaining from state 
regulation, which made sense in light of the prevailing paradigm of industrial self-regulation, 
without any acknowledgment that collective bargaining itself had largely disappeared. Scholars, 
too, have overlooked the dramatic changes in workplace governance in critiques of how the 
courts have interpreted ERISA. 
Understanding ERISA’s origin in an era of widespread industrial self-government is crucial 
to an analysis not only of how this system of health insurance law now operates as a technology 
of governance, but also of its potential for democratic reform. But before addressing that 
potential, we need to recognize how the Supreme Court’s interpretation of ERISA’s preemption 
provision has created a system of corporate federalism in health care. 
 
 
According to Justice Kennedy, one of the Framers’ greatest contributions to American law 
was to “split the atom of sovereignty” by recognizing the dual realms of state and national 
government.179
In this section, I analyze ERISA along the dimensions of federalism. I argue that ERISA is 
best understood as creating a triple sovereignty of federal, state, and corporate power for the 
 More modestly, the convergence of ERISA’s statutory text, its judicial 
interpretation, and financial pressure from inflation in the medical sector of the economy has 
produced a triple atomic split for governance of the health care insurance system, with the new 
offshoot being corporate sovereignty.  
                                                 
174 See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 157, at 48–49, 116. 
175 See Eduardo Porter, Cost of Benefits Cited as Factor in Slump in Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at A1; 
Swenson & Greer, supra note 31, at 620–21. 
176 See, e.g., Corey Kilgannon, Union Dissidents Say Transit Leader Gave Away Too Much, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 
2006, at B2. 
177 See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 157, at 126–27; Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of 
the Uninsured: Analysis of the March 2007 Current Population Survey, 310 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH 
INSTITUTE ISSUE BRIEF 4 (2007) (reporting that percentage of nonelderly population with employment-based 
insurance fell from 64.4% in 1994 to 62.2% in 2006); KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH AND 
EDUCATIONAL TRUST, supra note 28 (60% of employers offered health benefits in 2007, compared to 69% in 2000; 
among firms with three to nine employees, the offer rate fell from 57% to 45%).  
178 Beginning with their 2007–2008 contract, GM and the UAW have negotiated for the establishment of a 
Voluntary Employee Benefits Association (VEBA), which will operate as a trust fund to cover claims for health 
benefits by retired workers. See Sholnn Freeman & Frank Ahrens, GM, Union Agree on Contract to End Strike, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2007, at A1. 
179 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995). 
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governance of private health insurance. Under this structure, employers have gained authority to 
allocate health care risk through the control of decisions about which employees they will cover 
(pooling) and what benefits they will provide (rationing).180
This triple sovereignty is the result of the interpretation of ERISA by the judicial branch in a 
manner that blocks most state law regulation and by the subsequent lack of response by the 
federal political branch in a failure to amend ERISA. Although commentary regularly refers to 
the result of the Supreme Court’s ERISA preemption doctrine as a “regulatory vacuum,”
  
181
The ERISA framework empowers employers. Employers determine who is covered, how, 
and what the parameters of coverage will be.
 a 
vacuum exists only if one limits one’s view of regulation to purely governmental actions. If one 
understands private mechanisms to operate as part of governance, the Court’s preemption 
jurisprudence appears less as a vacuum than as a delegation, specifically the delegation of 
effective regulatory power to employers. 
A fundamental reality of the American health system is its voluntary baseline: employers 
may choose to offer health insurance, but they are not required to do so. If an employer decides 
to offer health insurance, ERISA establishes the framework for decisions made by employers 
along two dimensions of risk: the composition of risk pools (pooling) and the authorization to 
determine the scope of coverage (rationing).  
182 Employers also establish the mechanisms for 
deciding disputes over whether particular benefits are covered within the terms of the plan.183
One can imagine a legal system in which employers would generally make these decisions, 
but within constraints established by state law, either general laws (e.g., tort or contract laws) or 
laws specific to health care regulation. But that is not the model for employers today. ERISA 
occupies the field for private sector workplace health insurance plans because of and through its 
preemption provisions.
 
These issues of who is covered, for what, who gets to decide disputes that arise concerning those 
terms, and what the potential penalties are for wrongful denials of coverage set the boundaries of 
financial risk for the plan’s sponsor.  
184
1. The ERISA Accordion of “Relates to” Preemption 
  
 
 
A three-set process that I call the “ERISA accordion” sets the bounds of ERISA’s explicit 
“relates to” preemption clause. The three steps are found in section 514 of the statute, which 
begins by providing that ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now 
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .”185
                                                 
180 I intend “rationing” to denote both setting the terms of what services the plan covers and adjudicating disputes 
that arise over those terms. 
181 Justice Ginsburg has now taken up the point. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).  
182 See Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (“Nothing in ERISA requires employers to establish employee 
benefits plans. Nor does ERISA mandate what kind of benefits employers must provide if they choose to have such 
a plan.”) 
183 See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2001). 
 If one imagines an accordion spread 
184 At the last minute, Congressional conferees included a broad federal preemption clause to stave off multiple state 
standards. See WOOTEN, supra note 165, at 256, 258–59. The preemption clause satisfied concerns by employers 
that they not have to conform to differing state criteria in establishing benefit plans and the desire of labor unions to 
maintain benefits as a bargaining chip which could be freely negotiated up or down, vis-à-vis other issues such as 
wages, without mandated minimums or other requirements set by state legislatures.  
185 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000). 
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wide, the apparent meaning of the phrase “relate to any employee benefit plan” would seem to 
encompass an enormous range of state laws that would be preempted by ERISA. 
The broad scope of the “relates to” provision is curtailed, however, by what has been called 
the “savings clause.” This is the second step that pulls the accordion in a bit. Also part of section 
514, the savings clause provides that the “relates to” provision “shall [not] be construed to 
exempt or relieve any person from any [State law] which regulates insurance . . .”186 The savings 
clause thus contracts the preemptive power of ERISA to fit only the space not occupied by state 
laws which regulate insurance. Since enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945,187 
regulation of insurance has been left almost entirely to state government.188
 In the third step, the accordion widens again to reinstate preemption for certain entities. 
Under what is called the “deemer clause,” no employer benefit plan (EBP) that is self-insured 
“shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer . . . or to be engaged in the 
business of insurance . . . for purposes of any [State law] purporting to regulate insurance 
companies [or] insurance contracts . . .”
 The savings clause 
preserves this allocation of authority to the states.  
189
Self-insured plans, therefore, enjoy the full benefits of ERISA preemption. In self-insured 
plans, employers fund the plans without purchasing insurance against the risk of claim costs 
exceeding the available funds that have been set aside by the employer for paying benefits under 
the program.
  
190 Insurance companies handle only the administrative aspects of processing claims 
in self-insured plans. If an EBP is self-insured, deference to traditional state authority to regulate 
insurance will not apply.191
The movements of an accordion illustrate how the three steps relate to each other. But they 
tell us nothing about how wide or narrow each playing position will be. When litigation testing 
the ERISA preemption clause began, therefore, the Supreme Court had to pick its way—with 
little legislative guidance—through questions such as whether “relates to” should be given its 
broadest construction
  
192 or whether a state law had to specifically mention or allude to EBPs in 
order to trigger “relates to” preemption.193 Similarly, even if “relates to” had a wide sweep, its 
impact would be significantly diminished if the Court accorded similar breadth to the category of 
state laws that “regulate insurance,” whether directly or indirectly, whether statutorily or by 
common law principles.194
                                                 
186 Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). 
187 59 Stat. 34 (1945). 
188 See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429—31 (1946) (finding that the congressional purpose 
behind enactment was to “give support to … state systems for regulating … the business of insurance”). 
189 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). 
190 See Self-Insurance Institute of America, Inc., Self-Insured Group Health Plans, 
http://www.siia.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=3339 (last visited May 25, 2008). 
191 See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 65 (1990) (preempting state law prohibiting subrogation of the 
payment of the proceeds from a tort action to an insurer where the plan was self-insured); NGS Am., Inc. v. Barnes, 
805 F. Supp. 462, 475–76 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (holding that ERISA preempted Texas statute which imposed 
regulations, fees, and taxes upon self-funded ERISA plans and their administrators). 
192 See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1983). Because section 514 was a late addition during the 
passage of ERISA, and because Congress’s primary concern during the legislative process of ERISA was with 
pension plans rather than with health plans, the legislative history offers little to clarify congressional intent with 
regard to this phrase. 
193 Id. at 98. 
194 Id. at 104–05. 
 The Court thus acquired the authority, through its interpretation of 
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ERISA, to determine how much power the states would have to set the terms of private 
employment health insurance policy in America.  
 
2. Remedies Preemption 
  
Section 502 of ERISA sets forth the remedies available to enrollees in employee benefit 
plans who assert that they have been wrongfully denied a benefit due to them under the plan. 
This section provides exclusive federal court jurisdiction for actions brought under ERISA, and 
allows plaintiffs to “recover benefits due,” enjoin violations of the statute or of the plan, seek 
attorney’s fees and costs, and “obtain other appropriate equitable relief.”195
Through case law, however, the Supreme Court has created a remedies preemption in 
ERISA that is separate and distinct from the law’s explicit accordion preemption provision. The 
Court has inferred remedies preemption largely from a House-Senate Conference Report on 
ERISA.
 The relief provided 
for in section 502 does not include any consequential or non-economic damages for the denial of 
a benefit under the plan. There is also no provision in the remedies section of ERISA that 
explicitly preempts other state-law remedies that could be used for conduct that violates ERISA. 
196 The Conference Report states that suits to enforce benefit rights under ERISA are to 
be regarded solely as federal question claims, in the same way as suits asserting violations of the 
terms of a collective bargaining agreement are viewed as federal question claims that are 
preempted by section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act.197 The catalyst for this 
statement appears to have been vigorous lobbying by representatives of organized labor, who 
sought to preserve the terms of their CBAs, including the establishment of arbitration panels for 
disputes arising under the CBA, from encroachment by state regulation.198
3. The Evolution of ERISA’s Two Forms of Preemption  
 
In using ERISA’s legislative history to infer an implied preemption of state law remedies for 
the denial of benefits under an ERISA governed plan, however, the Supreme Court never 
questioned the appropriateness of transplanting a preemption doctrine from a statute designed to 
protect the ability of unions and management to conclusively settle questions concerning the 
workplace into a legal context in which there was no counterweight to management power. 
Instead, the Court silently rewrote a provision designed to privilege collective bargaining 
agreements into a bar against seeking damages through state law, even for bad faith violations of 
one-sided contracts. 
 
 
The dynamics behind ERISA preemption have shifted in opposite directions for the two 
forms of preemption under ERISA. In its early cases interpreting section 514, the Court reliably 
invalidated state laws by a literal and expansive reading of the phrase “relates to.” Since 1995, 
however, the Court has changed the ground rules for section 514 preemption, finding that the 
preemption inquiry should begin with a presumption in favor of state laws regulating health 
                                                 
195 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(9) (2000). 
196 See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54–56 (1987). 
197 H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 327 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N 4639, 5107. 
198 See Fox & Schaffer, supra note 169. 
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care.199 In addition to retracting the scope of “relates to,” the Court has also expanded the scope 
of the second step in the accordion—the insurance savings clause.200
The literalism in readings of ERISA’s accordion preemption began in 1983 with the first 
ERISA preemption case concerning health benefits to reach the Supreme Court: Shaw v. Delta 
Air Lines, Inc.
 
 During the same period, however, the Court has refused to budge from its broad 
application of remedies preemption, leading to the paradox that the implicit form of preemption 
under ERISA is now more powerful than the statute’s explicit preemption command. This has 
not resulted from a commitment to hyper-textualism or an antipathy to legislative purposes. 
Rather, I argue that the Court has become increasingly tied to ERISA’s purpose as it relates to 
risk governance. One particularly important actor that has influenced the Court to place 
sensitivity to financial risk allocation policy at the heart of its ERISA jurisprudence has been the 
Office of the Solicitor General. 
201 Shaw involved a New York anti-discrimination statute that required employers 
to treat pregnancy the same as other health conditions.202 Among the policies affected by the 
New York state law were health benefits plans covered by ERISA. In ruling on whether the New 
York statute fell under the first step of the ERISA accordion as a “State law . . . [that] may now 
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan,”203 the Court relied on the “breadth . . . apparent 
from [the] language” of section 514’s preemption clause.204 The Court found that “the normal 
sense of the phrase” meant that a law related to an ERISA plan “if it has a connection with or 
reference to such a plan.”205
The brief filed by the Solicitor General’s office in Shaw influenced the Court’s analysis of 
Congressional intent with regard to ERISA. The Court identified Congress’s desire to 
accommodate an employer’s interest in avoiding “conflicting or inconsistent State and local 
regulation of [EBPs]” as a major part of the purpose behind ERISA.
 
206 The Solicitor General’s 
brief stressed that goal, twice driving home the point that shielding employers from variances in 
state laws was intended by Congress “to foster the development of benefits plans.”207
The Solicitor General’s brief framed ERISA itself in negative terms, as a law placing 
significant burdens on employers, and suggested that broad preemption was the compensation 
for such burdens: “Sensitive to the fact that the private benefit plan system is voluntary on the 
part of employers, Congress determined to lessen the disruptive effect of the new federal law by 
  
                                                 
199 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654–55 (1995). 
200 In Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 341–42 (2003), the Court “ma[d]e a clean break” from 
its prior rulings that limited application of the savings clause to laws that satisfied all three factors derived from the 
McCarran-Ferguson statute previously used to define insurance. The Court ruled that a statute requiring health 
benefit plans to include “any willing provider” in their provider networks “substantially affect[ed] the risk pooling 
arrangement between the insurer and the insured,” and thus was covered by the savings clause and not preempted by 
ERISA. Id. at 330. 
201 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983). 
202 Congress adopted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) after the litigation began but prior to the Court’s 
decision. Although ERISA did not preempt or preclude the PDA, the case was not moot because of the claim for 
benefits due before the PDA took effect and because the state law reached smaller employers that were not subject 
to the PDA. See id. at 92–93. 
203 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000). 
204 Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96. 
205 Id. at 97. 
206 Id. at 105 n.25. 
207 Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 17, Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 
(1983) (No. 81-1578). 
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saving plans from possibly inconsistent or duplicative state laws.”208 The Solicitor General thus 
implicitly warned the Court that if it did not interpret ERISA in a way that could allow large 
employers to achieve cost savings from single administrative systems, it might increase the 
number of uninsured by driving employers away from voluntarily sponsoring any health benefit 
plans.209
 In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,
  
210 a case before the Court two years after Shaw, 
the need to encourage employers to offer voluntary plans again came to the fore. In Pilot Life, an 
insurance company asserted that ERISA preempted a Mississippi common law right of action for 
bad faith denial of claims. The beneficiary of the plan had sued Pilot Life, the insurance 
company, in state court for damages from repeated denials and delays in the payment of a claim 
that the insurer had ultimately accepted.211 During oral argument, after an extended colloquy 
with the Justices about whether an insured “could get [any] money” if an insurer persisted in 
stonewalling on payment,212 counsel for Pilot Life pressed a point raised by Justice White: that 
large punitive damages awards “would also raise insurance premiums substantially.”213 Although 
there was no legislative history on this precise point, counsel reasoned that “in ERISA Congress 
had that concern . . . these plans are voluntary, nobody has to set them up. This is a law to 
provide for a voluntary system that companies will take on individually. So it was intended to be 
run efficiently and effectively, and at low cost.”214
 The Court in Pilot Life recognized, for the first time, that ERISA’s system of remedies 
created its own powerful force for preemption without an explicit textual base.
 
 215 The source for 
this new doctrine, which became an independent basis for preemption,216 was the amicus brief 
filed by then Solicitor General Charles Fried.217 The Court concluded that the remedial scheme 
that Congress had adopted in ERISA “represents a careful balancing of the need for prompt and 
fair claims settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation of 
employee benefit plans.”218
 By the time Pegram v. Herdrich reached the Court thirteen years later,
 This language frames the interests as those of individual enrollees 
versus the broader need to entice employers to offer benefits. All intimations of employee 
collective bargaining or industrial self-government were gone. 
219
                                                 
208 Id. at 22. 
209 See id. at 28. 
210 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987). 
211 Id. at 43–44. 
212 Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–10, Pilot Life, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (No. 85-1043). 
213 Id. at 14. 
214 Id. 
215 Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 57 (describing ERISA’s enforcement and remedies provisions as the “most important[]” 
consideration in its preemption analysis).  
216 See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208–09 (2004). 
217 Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52. 
218 Id. at 54. 
219 Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
 the Justices had 
developed a very clear-eyed focus on the relationship between potential liability for employers 
through litigation and how the health care system’s structure was carefully balanced on a 
foundation of risk allocation. At the core of the Pegram opinion is an understanding of ERISA 
not simply as a specification of certain rights and duties, but as a charter under which employers 
voluntarily undertake the responsibility for providing health insurance coverage to the bulk of 
the U.S. population in return for the state ceding control to such employers of all determinants of 
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risk in the health care setting.220 Two years later, in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, the 
Court described ERISA policy as “inducing employers to offer benefits by assuring a predictable 
set of liabilities, under uniform standards of primary conduct and a uniform regime of ultimate 
remedial orders and awards.” 221
The existence of ERISA’s deemer clause, the third step of the ERISA accordion, supports 
the inference that Congress intended to protect discretionary management of risk. The deemer 
clause of the ERISA accordion explicitly treats some workplace plans differently. If a plan self-
insures, that is, if it assumes the risk itself without purchasing full insurance coverage for that 
risk, that plan receives a pass on even having to contest whether a state law regulates insurance. 
The second step of the accordion—exempting from preemption state laws that “regulate 
insurance”—simply does not apply to self-insured plans.
  
222
 On the surface, it may be hard to discern a policy rationale for creating a tier of legal 
deference for employers depending on how they have chosen to structure their health benefit 
plans.
 In effect, the greater the risk 
assumed by the sponsor of a plan, the stronger the sovereignty principle that will attach to the 
plan. 
223
 Contrary to some other scholars, I do not believe that one can attribute the Supreme 
Court’s solicitude for protecting EBP sponsors from bothersome state regulation simply to an 
inclination by the Court to favor a corporate desire to lower costs and preserve profit levels. The 
Supreme Court has ruled that increased expenses directly caused by state rate-setting laws will 
not justify the “relates to” preemption;
 The deemer clause has the effect of exempting an entity from insurance regulation not 
because it is not really engaged in insurance practices (and for that reason should not fall within 
the scope of state laws regulating insurance), but because risk underwriting and spreading is 
precisely what it is engaged in. The only logical basis for making such a distinction between 
employer benefit plans (EBPs) that will remain subject to state laws regulating insurance, and 
those that will gain the benefit of complete preemption, is the goal of facilitating corporate 
governance organized around allocation of risk.  
224 and that benefits expensed from general company 
assets (such as vacation pay) rather than from an insurance fund cannot be considered part of an 
EBP under ERISA.225
Rather it is the unpredictability of potential damages, especially punitive damages, that 
distinguishes the function of the implied but more powerful remedies preemption doctrine from 
the explicit guidance for preemption found in section 514. Indeed, the fears associated with out-
 Mere cost reduction associated with employee benefits has not been 
enough to cause the Court to defer to management decisions. 
                                                 
220 In Pegram, the defendant was the HMO, not the employer. But the Court’s comments foreswearing a judicial role 
in “draw[ing] a line between good and bad HMOs,” id. at 221, ultimately reinforce the authority of the plan sponsor 
to adjust levels of financial risk by selecting an HMO or other provider network with whom to contract for services. 
As the Court noted, “whatever the HMO, there must be rationing and inducement to ration.” Id. Deferring to the 
superior capacity of the legislative process to assess trade-offs, the Court concluded that “courts are not in a position 
to derive a sound legal principle to differentiate [HMOs].” Id. at 222. 
221 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379 (2002). 
222 See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990). 
223 Justice Blackmun noted the apparent illogic, but deferred to ERISA’s explicit declaration of a distinct category. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 746–747 (1985).  
224 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. 645, 662 (1995) (“Cost 
uniformity almost certainly is not an object of pre-emption.”). 
225 Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115–16 (1989). 
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of-control punitive damages have spawned a new branch of due process jurisprudence.226 Capital 
markets in the managed care industry also overreact to risk associated with litigation.227
 In a steadily developing line of cases, the Court has shifted its framing and analysis of 
ERISA from a law designed to serve as a protective mechanism against sponsor abuse of 
employee benefits into a law that operates as a shield for plan sponsors against unpredictable 
financial risk. The greater receptivity to big business demands occurred during long stretches of 
Republican control of Congress and of the Executive Branch, which brought an unsurprising 
conservatization of the federal judiciary. But such receptivity continued largely without 
interruption during the Clinton Administration as well,
 What 
seems essential in the ERISA health benefit cases is the Court’s apparent belief that too much 
judicial tinkering could lead not simply to increases in corporate costs, but rather to the danger 
that a health insurance/care system based on voluntary actions by employers could crater and 
crash.  
228 and has been reflected in mostly 
unanimous decisions by the Supreme Court.229 The Supreme Court’s sub silentio policymaking 
has also been implicitly ratified by the absence of major alterations to ERISA by either of the 
political branches of the federal government.230
 Today, after dozens of decisions, there is no mystery about the division of power. Bluntly 
put, the regulatory power of states over health care policy involving workplace health insurance 
exists only when it is least likely to infringe on an employer’s discretion to control and predict 
financial risk.
 
231 Through its interpretation of ERISA, the Court has developed a distinctive twist 
on federalism, sharply contrasting with its approach to Tenth Amendment cases and other 
situations involving conflicts between federal and state power.232
                                                 
226 State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419–29 (2003) (noting that jury award of punitive 
damages may violate guarantee of procedural due process if excessive). 
227 See M. Gregg Bloche & David M. Studdert, A Quiet Revolution: Law As An Agent of Health System Change, 23 
HEALTH AFF. 29, 36–38 (2004). 
 Using ERISA federalism, the 
228 Had President Clinton’s proposal for heath care reform been enacted, of course, the changes would have been 
enormous: for example, employees who are not now covered would have been incorporated into regional health 
insurance alliances and certain minimum criteria would have applied to the package of benefits offered through 
workplace health insurance. See HACKER, THE ROAD TO NOWHERE, supra note 37, at 124–27. 
229 Pilot Life, Pegram, and Davila were all decided without dissents.  
230 Modest changes to enhance portability and to require issuance of small group plans (with no caps on cost) 
emerged from enactment of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1161 (1994). In 
addition, regulations issued in 1998 reformed some of the procedural problems in the process for appealing denials 
of claims. See 29 C.F.R. 2560.503-1 (2001). 
231 Peter Jacobson’s study of the relationship between the legal system and managed care entities concluded that 
courts have consistently developed common law principles in support of market arrangements, shifting from 
doctrines reinforcing physicians’ professional dominance to those protecting the contractual provisions negotiated 
by MCOs as the balance of power in the health care system has shifted. See JACOBSON, supra note 36, at 177–78. I 
argue that the courts are doing more than reading weathervanes to see the changes in prevailing powers, but are also 
affirmatively protecting entities that have undertaken the social function of rationalizing financial risk.  
232 The Court developed its interpretation of ERISA during the same time period as its renaissance of deference to 
state as opposed to federal law. Especially under Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court reclaimed and elaborated upon 
the concept of state sovereignty. ERISA jurisprudence, however, seemingly confounds this standard interpretation of 
the politics of federalism. While facilitating employer interests fits with a simple model of outcome-driven 
federalism, the ideological cost to conservatives from favoring federal law was significant. Enforcement of ERISA 
preemption provisions produced a massive undercutting of state government policymaking at the intersection of two 
traditionally state domains: insurance regulation and the police power of the state to regulate the health care system. 
See Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 43, 50–53 (2006); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the 
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Court has delegated the lion’s share of health risk-governance policymaking to private 
employers.  
 
C. A PARTIAL DEFENSE OF WORKPLACE FEDERALISM 
 
 At this point in the argument, many critics of ERISA preemption doctrine for health 
insurance benefits (and there are virtually no defenders in the academy) argue for repealing or 
weakening the law’s preemptive impact.233 I disagree. There are significant costs to the current 
system of employer-based health insurance and the ERISA preemption that shields such 
insurance from state regulation.234
 In the context of health insurance, I theorize corporate entities as resembling a functional 
hybrid of national and state governments, comprising some of the benefits of each. For example, 
allowing an employer with workers in multiple states to avoid conflicting state regulations 
permits that organization to capture the benefits of a national market and facilitates rational 
large-scale planning. In the traditional terms of the federalist debate, this is similar to the 
Hamiltonian notion of nation-building and the facilitation of a single market provided by a strong 
national government.
 I see no need to rehearse those well-developed arguments 
here. My claim, simply, is that critics of ERISA preemption have failed to explore and consider 
possible legitimate interests that might be served by strong preemption in the federal law, 
interests that might ultimately prove useful in achieving better equity in the current system.  
In this section, therefore, I offer a partial defense of the system of the triple sovereignty (but 
without granting all prerogatives to management) that ERISA preemption has established. My 
argument is that it is worthwhile to illuminate progressive interests that might be served by 
workplace federalism. Such interests might then be leveraged in a manner that achieves more 
equitable results if the democracy deficit in workplace risk-pool governance could be adequately 
addressed, a challenge I take up in the next section. 
235
At the same time, the multiplicity of employers also serves some of the functions of the 
multiple states, a la Jeffersonian local autonomy and decentralized democracy. Although each 
organization engages in central planning, there is no one omnipotent planning source for all 
employers. This degree of decentralization guards against the establishment of a single uniform 
workplace benefits structure that might leave employees without any power, through exit and 
mobility, to seek a job with a different set of benefits.
  
236
                                                                                                                                                             
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 51–53 (2007); Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, 
Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1376–80 (2006); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 
227–29 (2000). 
233 See, e.g., Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme Court Allow the States to 
Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 951, 1023–25 (2000); Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign 
States: Preemption and the Second Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 
FORDHAM L. REV. 469, 543–52 (1993); James E. Holloway, Revisiting Cooperative Federalism in Mandated 
Employer-Sponsored Health Care Programs Under the ERISA Preemption Provision, 8 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 
239, 286–87 (2005); Edward A. Zelinsky, Travelers, Reasoned Textualism, and the New Jurisprudence of ERISA 
Preemption, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 863–70 (1999). 
234 See Richard Briffault & Sherry Glied, Federalism and the Future of Health Care Reform, in THE PRIVATIZATION 
OF HEALTH CARE REFORM: LEGAL AND REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES 49, 65–71 (M. Gregg Bloche ed., 2003). 
235 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 11 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 
236 The common interests of an employer and employees in strong corporate sovereignty, at least in unionized 
workplaces where there is not a democracy deficit, was strikingly evident during oral argument in Metropolitan Life 
Insurance, 471 U.S. 724 (1985), a case in which both employers and unions joined in challenging a Massachusetts 
Page 36 of 50 
 
Corporate sovereignty thus mimics the advantages associated with the powers of states in a 
system of federalism. And the disadvantages of strong corporate sovereignty are similar to the 
disadvantages of state governments that are too strong in a system of federalism. If federal law 
exempts many EBPs from regulation centered in the geopolitical jurisdiction in which particular 
groups of workers live, that permits employers to trigger significant negative externalities for 
that locale. For example, if employers in a state can control, without any constraints by state 
regulation, which employees are admitted to an employer’s risk pool (e.g., full time workers, but 
not part time workers) and what benefits individuals admitted to the risk pool will receive (e.g., 
physician coverage but not mental health coverage), that will necessarily leave a number of 
individuals outside of workplace plans or without access to certain benefits. The costs of that 
imbalance will be borne by state and federal taxpayers through increased costs in Medicaid and 
state public hospitals and emergency centers.237
And, continuing the metaphor, just as in federalism debates about governmental 
jurisdictions, an argument in favor of employer independence, even in light of resulting 
externalities, is that such independence is the price of innovation. Allowing political space for 
variation enables laboratories of experimentation to exist. And corporate entities today do, in 
fact, function as laboratories in the development of health policy, not only with regard to health 
insurance coverage, but also with regard to delivery of health services and quality 
improvement.
  
238
Of course, the corporate-state analogy is imperfect. Obviously employers are not subject to 
the direct democratic control that, however incompletely, exists in states. From the citizen-
worker’s perspective, however, social relations may produce a simulacrum of collectivity. A 
sense of community attaches to the workplace as well as to political jurisdictions. Co-workers 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
law that required all health insurance plans in the state to include coverage for mental health coverage. In that case, 
counsel for plaintiffs argued that:  
 
[J]ust as there is no such thing as a free lunch, there is no such thing as a free benefit. The 
mandated benefit has to be paid for. So, to offset the additional expense you either have to reduce 
wages or you have to sacrifice a benefit that you want for a benefit that you don't want . . . . One 
union had to give up dental benefits and eyeglass benefits that they very badly wanted and had to 
increase eligibility requirements in order to get mental health benefits about which they were less 
concerned [but which had been mandated by the State]. 
 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Metropolitan Life Ins., 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (No. 84-325). When Justice 
Rehnquist probed why the state’s policy forcing these kinds of trade-offs should not be enforced, counsel responded: 
 
Because Congress made it quite clear that it wanted the benefit package to be a matter of private 
choice. To take an example, a coal miner has different health priorities, different needs, different 
desires than an airplane pilot would have. And, Congress very clearly left that part to private 
regulation.  
 
Id. at 7. 
237 See, e.g., Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 183–84 (4th Cir. 2007). These externalized costs 
are the primary reason states struggle against ERISA preemption, as they seek to regulate access and cost in ways 
that can encompass persons in private employment-based insurance. 
238 See JILL QUADAGNO, ONE NATION UNINSURED: WHY THE U.S. HAS NO NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 146–49 
(2005); Robert Galvin & Arnold Milstein, Large Employers’ New Strategies in Health Care, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
939 (2002); SHARON SILOW-CARROLL & TANYA ALTERAS, COMMONWEALTH FUND, VALUE-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE 
PURCHASING: FOUR STATES THAT ARE AHEAD OF THE CURVE (Aug. 2007), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/1052_Silow-Carroll_value-driven_purchasing.pdf. 
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share an affiliative identity based on their employment, which may be experienced as 
comparable in strength to their felt affiliation with their state of residence. Even without 
collective bargaining in the workplace, this sense of community can translate into a willingness 
to exert pressure in efforts to alter management decisions regarding benefits. In short, even if one 
disagrees with the comparison, an ERISA jurisprudence that treats corporate health insurance 
plan sponsors in ways analogous to how states are treated in traditional federalism is not 
irrational along either legal or cultural dimensions.239
IV. THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT IN HEALTH CARE 
 
 The free rein given to employers by ERISA’s strong pre-emptive power provides 
independence to employers for crafting risk-governance approaches, including making decisions 
that affect the delivery of health services and quality improvement. Health policy writ small is 
thus effectively being enacted in localized laboratories of workplaces throughout the country. 
The question I want to turn to is the following: if these local laboratories were infused with 
democratic processes, could this corporate power be leveraged in a manner that would achieve 
more equitable results—both on a local and a national level? 
 
 
In the current state of health insurance governance writ large, the American public lacks any 
significant input into the politics of risk distribution. There is no structure today that 
meaningfully engages citizens in grappling with questions of access and cost in health care. As a 
result, democratic engagement with health policy lacks both depth and a mechanism for active 
participation. 
There are several recent examples of the American electorate engaging with health care 
issues. Among these have been the public’s demand for health care reform fueled by insecurity 
about access to coverage;240
                                                 
239 As I noted at the outset, this is only a partial defense of workplace federalism. Apart from the costs that have 
already been outlined by various commentators, see supra note 
 the longstanding aversion to what voters believe amounts to 
232 and infra notes 244 and 245, ERISA federalism 
affects political dynamics in health policymaking in negative ways. Large employers obviously have tremendous 
influence in Congress. As a practical matter, no reform of the health insurance/care system will go forward without 
significant employer support. But employers do not have a legal entitlement to block reform should a proposal 
garner sufficient legislative and executive support to enable its enactment. 
 By contrast, at the state level, employers have what amounts to an ERISA-given veto that they bring to the 
bargaining table. The practical effects of this legally created veto can be seen in the efforts of two states to require 
large employers to offer health insurance. In Maryland, a trade association challenged legislation requiring a “pay or 
play system” (known as the “Walmart law”) as preempted by ERISA. See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 
475 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the effect of the state law was to 
mandate the terms of EBPs in Maryland and therefore the law was preempted by ERISA. See id. at 198. In 
Massachusetts, by contrast, a reform effort in the state was undertaken together with employer representatives and 
produced a law that employers chose to support. See Sidney D. Watson et al., The Road from Massachusetts to 
Missouri: What Will It Take for Other States to Replicate Massachusetts Health Reform?, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1331, 
1331–32 (2007). What might well have been a successful ERISA challenge has never been filed. See Edward A. 
Zelinsky, The New Massachusetts Health Law: Preemption and Experimentation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 229 
(2007) (arguing that the Massachusetts health reform law that took effect in 2007 could not survive an ERISA 
preemption challenge). 
240 See HACKER, THE ROAD TO NOWHERE, supra note 37, at 16–20. 
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“socialized medicine”241; and the populist backlash against managed care entities and insurers in 
the 1990s.242
But the public’s engagement with health policy tends to be episodic and its understandings 
shallow. For example, the widespread populist backlash against the most stringent managed-
care-cost-control mechanisms led to a surge of state legislation in the late 1990’s.
  
243
The actual quality of public knowledge at the policy level, however, is low.
 This 
backlash is probably best understood as a compound phenomenon. It is extremely difficult to 
tease apart the multiple claims that fueled these initiatives: a demand for patient subjectivity 
against the culture of impersonal treatment by physicians who were strangers; a demand for 
accountability against the abuses of some MCOs in denying appropriate treatment because of 
cost; and a demand by physicians for reinstatement of some measure of their traditional 
authority. 
 Health care politics is misleading in its apparent accessibility. Virtually everyone 
experiences the health care system, either directly as a patient or indirectly through a friend or 
family member, and therefore has views about how the system can be improved. As a result, 
there is a great breadth of public opinion about health care. Politically, these reactions can 
translate into votes for a candidate whose views seem to mirror one’s own.  
244
The participatory dimension of the public’s relation to health care policy is also largely 
missing.
 Part of what 
the public lacks is depth of knowledge. The system’s underlying structures of financial risk 
allocation, embodied in such provisions as ERISA and tax law, are complex and not well known 
or understood. The result is that policy decisions are delegated to holders of specialized 
knowledge, and are effectively hidden from the public, even if they are hidden in plain sight.  
245
In this Part, I offer a normative argument for enhancing democratic engagement in health 
care system governance and a proposal for doing so grounded in the pragmatic spirit of 
 Limits on public understanding and knowledge are exacerbated by limits on 
mechanisms by which members of the public can participate effectively in health care system 
governance. Although individuals are increasingly empowered as patients, particularly through 
their use of the web to retrieve information about symptoms and treatment, the idea that serious 
public engagement with health care system governance is a viable concept seldom surfaces in 
public consciousness. As a result, there is a huge democracy deficit in health care system 
governance today. 
                                                 
241 QUADAGNO, supra note 235, at 30–46; STARR, supra note 94, at 283–89. 
242 See Mark A. Peterson, Introduction: Politics, Misperception, or Apropos?, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 873, 
875 (1999). 
243 See David Mechanic, The Managed Care Backlash: Perceptions and Rhetoric in Health Care Policy and the 
Potential for Health Care Reform, 79 MILBANK Q. 35, 37–38 (2001). 
244 Drawing data from multiple public surveys, researchers found that on average, only 36% of persons surveyed 
could correctly answer knowledge questions regarding a range of health-related issues and only 30% gave correct 
answers for questions addressing health policy. See Mollyann Brodie et al., Health News and the American Public, 
1996–2002, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 927, 939 tbl.4 (2003). 
245 This situation is not unique to health policy, but is part of a larger socio-political landscape, in which many 
citizens express little trust in participatory forms of democratic politics because they are too busy, uninterested, or 
repelled by politics to want to participate. See JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH 
DEMOCRACY 85–128 (2002). Levels of participation are also sharply skewed by economic class. A 1990 citizen 
participation study found that those with the highest incomes ($125,000 or more) were three times as likely to be 
involved in a civic organization as those with the lowest incomes ($15,000 or less). See Kay Lehman Schlozman et 
al., Civic Participation and the Equality Problem, in CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 427, 446–47 
(Theda Skocpol & Morris P. Fiorina eds., 1999). 
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democratic experimentalism.246
To be clear: I share the concerns of many regarding the negative policy implications of 
tethering health insurance to the workplace.
 I argue that beyond the identities of patient and consumer, 
individuals can and should assume the role and identity of citizen in the health care system. 
Because governance encompasses more than just actions by the state, I believe that we should 
seek to develop a meaningful concept of health care system citizenship and apply it to private 
sector institutions as well as to government. Drawing on insights from new governance theory, I 
argue that workplace-based risk pools have the potential to function not merely as actuarial 
groupings, but as political entities as well.  
In section A, I frame my argument for health care system citizenship as harmonious with the 
concept of a “public” developed by Jurgen Habermas. I argue that such a public can develop a 
knowledge base and body of experience with practical governance issues at a localized level. 
Cumulatively and over time, the emergence of this public might then reshape the dynamics of 
health care system policymaking on a broader, governmental level. 
In section B, I argue that policymakers should study the possibility that risk pools associated 
with employment-based health insurance would provide the best platform for building new 
institutions of health care system citizenship. Because of the dense social connections that 
characterize most workplaces, the employment setting offers what is perhaps a unique 
environment for creating democracy-enhancing governance processes that can operate among 
members of a risk pool. In addition, because the legal structure created by ERISA already shifts 
significant control over pooling and rationing decisions to employer sponsors of health care, this 
approach could leverage that structure in a progressive normative direction by enhancing the 
worker voice in those decisions. 
247 Indeed, I believe an optimal health care system 
would function as a universal, national plan.248
A. BUILDING NEW PUBLICS FOR HEALTH POLICY 
 However, I also believe that the practical politics 
of our day dictate that employer-based health insurance will continue as a dominant force of our 
health care system for some time to come. In light of that reality, I offer the following normative 
argument and proposal for enhancing democratic engagement in health care system governance. 
 
 
One way to begin addressing the problem of Americans’ shallow engagement with health 
policy issues is to conceptualize such debates as occurring within a “public,” using the analytic 
structure developed by Jurgen Habermas. In Habermas’s work, the concept of a “public” denotes 
                                                 
246 In American legal scholarship, “democratic experimentalism” is most closely associated with an approach to 
public law that emphasizes collaborative regulatory initiatives, and uses principles of decentralization and 
stakeholder participation to develop new and less bureaucratic models of regulation and program administration. See 
generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 
267 (1998); Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 886 (2003) 
(stating that democratic experimentalism is “principally a model of participatory administration”). 
247 Even defenders of workplace-based health insurance recite a litany of its shortcomings. See, e.g., David A. 
Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 
23, 26–30 (2001). 
248 See, e.g., THEODORE R. MARMOR, UNDERSTANDING HEALTH CARE REFORM 179–94 (1994); Judith Feder, 
Crowd-Out and the Politics of Health Reform, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 461 (2004); Steffie Woolhandler et al., 
Proposal of the Physicians Working Group for Single-Payer National Health Insurance, 290 JAMA 798 (Aug. 
2003). 
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a cultural and social space, not a physical space, for dialogue about shared concerns.249 Central 
to Habermas’s thinking is the claim that the quality of society depends on the quality of our 
dialogic engagement on important issues.250 The quality of that engagement, in turn, depends on 
whether the procedures for engagement reflect core ethical concerns such as equality of 
participation.251
My suggestion, therefore, is that we consider using risk pools as a venue for building publics 
in the Habermasian sense. Conceptually, a risk pool is the local organizational and governance 
unit of any insurance plan. However, it is seldom thought of in terms of self-governance. Risk 
pools are actuarial constructs. They exist as clusters of individuals whose characteristics cause 
them to fall within some category of risk relevant to the form of insurance being sold (e.g., the 
risk pool of teenage drivers or of beachfront property owners). These are groups that generally 
lack social meaning for their members; governance of the group is subsumed, without much 
attention paid by its members, in an organization’s financial management or simply into an 
insurer’s classification system.
 
Because democracy is not possible without meaningful participation, we advance 
democratic norms in the governance of any system when we enhance the capacity of citizens to 
debate and discuss substantive issues and to participate in their resolution. If one sees the health 
care system as centered on risk managerialism, the central issue for enriching the democratic 
characteristics of such a system becomes how to empower citizens to participate more effectively 
in the politics of risk allocation and distribution. 
252
The relatively small size of such groups, compared to the electorate, combined with the 
particularity of the issues before them, might also create a venue in which the ideological stakes 
 
But the risk pools on which group health insurance plans are based are different. I explore 
those differences in more detail in the following section. But my core argument is that such risk 
pools have the capacity to function also as publics. Acting locally, a risk-pool governance group 
could engage the basic questions such as who and what should be covered in a particular context, 
how to manage cost concerns, and what process should be used for resolving the inevitable 
disputes over coverage that will arise.  
How much decisionmaking power a risk-pool governance group might hold is a separate 
question and is one that I outline below. The point I wish to make here is simply that creating a 
process by which such questions would be debated, and by which input would be solicited, could 
generate a new kind of health policy public: groups of health care system citizenry that are 
deliberatively engaged in small-scale associative institutions dealing with the distributionary 
politics of risk.  
Risk-pool governance groups would thus be sites outside formal political structures in which 
“public” deliberations would be taking place. In ideal form, these groups would create space for 
political participation, debate and opinion formation within the economic sector and as part of 
the system of risk managerialism. The deliberations of the group would require participants to 
engage with the arguments, concerns, and beliefs of others in the same risk pool, thus creating 
the potential for understandings that transcend self-interest. 
                                                 
249 See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND 
DEMOCRACY 360 (1995). 
250 Id. at 409. 
251 Id. 
252 See Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 771, 772–74 (1988) 
[hereinafter Simon, The Ideological Effects]. 
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of health politics could de-escalate. Health-governance issues at the local level would be 
problems that need to be solved, rather than opportunities to argue about grand philosophical 
conflicts.253 Indeed, they would necessitate decisions to be resolved in a manner for which 
simple resort to abstract principles would simply not suffice.254
But I believe that the potential of such local governance groups is more significant than that. 
In the long run, localized engagement would almost certainly serve a broader educative function. 
The smaller scale of risk pools will have no evasive effect on the tough questions of cost and 
quality. Risk-pool governance groups will still need to confront head-on the tensions and trade-
offs in allocating resources for health care through the setting of terms for insurance coverage.
 
The smallness of scale of the groups could be considered a drawback for the large-scale 
project of remedying the democracy deficit in health care policy writ large. The kind of 
engagement I envision might increase the deliberative quality of a health policy decision for a 
localized risk pool, but would not necessarily produce debates about the more complex and 
global questions concerning health care. It would not, for example, address the larger questions 
of the proper role for market forces in determining care or the comparative advantages and 
disadvantages of a single-payer system. Given that reality, risk- pool governance groups might 
be thought of as better schools for democracy rather than as a useful mechanism for the 
enhancement of national health policy.  
255
Harnessing the economic power of risk pools to democratic governance structures could 
thus have a powerful effect on the quality of American political culture as it engages with health 
 
Ideally, broader policy preferences in such deliberative groups would emerge from an 
accumulation of smaller decisions. In the process, the individuals directly involved in the groups 
would become indigenous experts with regard to the risk pools. They would need to describe, 
explain and justify their decisions to their peers, and in return, their peers would be responsible 
for providing reaction and responses. 
Similar sets of managerial issues might well arise for different risk groups. There would thus 
be the potential for networks of locally based groups to affiliate and link up. One can envision 
the beginnings of a functioning, informed democratic political community organized around 
health care system governance issues. 
                                                 
253 The potential advantage from building participatory models from the ground up is evident from the recurrent 
stalemate on reform options. Public opinion polls document that although there is supermajoritarian support for 
“universal health care,” the consensus falls apart when individuals are asked to choose between methods for 
achieving that goal. See Jennifer Prah Ruger, Health, Health Care, and Incompletely Theorized Agreements: A 
Normative Theory of Health Policy Decision Making, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 51, 72–73 (2007). 
254 To that extent, they would offer the potential for “practical discourse,” which Habermas describes as engagement 
with specific issues of immediate concern to those participating in the discussion. HABERMAS, supra note 246, at 
60–61. In his conceptualization, however, ideal practical discourse requires a deep commitment to egalitarian rules 
of participation. I am not claiming that risk-pool governance groups would necessarily satisfy those criteria. See 
JURGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE ETHICS 163 (1993); cf. Michael 
Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net : Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003) 
(arguing that internet standard setting does satisfy Habermas’s criteria for ideal practical discourse). 
255 For example, group participants might choose to prioritize cost controls more than is currently typical. If one 
major problem in health care consumption patterns is that individuals are too shielded from the real costs of care by 
the role of employer-subsidized insurance, the active engagement of individuals in grappling with cost/coverage 
trade-offs can only be helpful. Employees who are organized and well informed could provide a powerful 
constituency for cost containment mechanisms. Long before managed care, unions that were significantly involved 
in health insurance policy in the 1950s sought to curb costs by arranging for prepaid medical services, but were 
unable to overcome the combined opposition of insurers and the medical profession. See MUNTS, supra note 147, at 
159, 164–69, 172–76.  
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policy issues. Providing mechanisms for citizens to have a greater level of participation in 
shaping the parameters of their own health insurance could publicize the managerial discourse of 
risk allocation. It would allow for this discourse to be reinterpreted in a public discussion as a set 
of political, rather than predominately technical, questions. Such debates could only increase the 
sophistication and the accessibility of the public policy discussion at the meta-level. 
 Finally, an important contribution of self-governance structures at the level of risk pools 
would be to make it easier for citizens to infuse risk allocation discourse with moral values. As 
Deborah Stone has argued, insurance is a technology of governance which invites contemplation 
about issues of social responsibility because it requires resolution of questions about compassion 
and collective responses to suffering.256 In a world of individualism and competition, the very 
presence of insurance “legitimates social obligation and mutual aid.”257 More widespread citizen 
engagement with such issues would, in effect, democratize the norm-setting implicit in the 
process of health insurance risk allocation at the local level.258
 Democratic governance at the level of risk pools could thus change the valence of risk 
discourse. Analysts often link a discourse of risk managerialism to economic models and market-
based initiatives that are focused on efficiency rather than on equity.
 
259 But a discourse of risk 
could just as naturally be invoked to further strategies of inclusion and collective responsibility. 
“Risk centered governance,” as Pat O’Malley has noted, comprises “a heterogeneous array of 
practices with diverse effects and implications . . . not limited to a cadre of experts practicing the 
dark arts.”260
B. NEW WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE 
 Risk-pool governance groups provide the potential of creating new democratic 
points of intervention in this discursive system. 
 
 
To build a public, in the Habermasian sense of creating an ongoing structured conversation 
based on knowledge and a respectful engagement with other citizens, requires a realistic 
infrastructure. Workplaces are major repositories of the kind of social capital that could enable 
meaningful participatory engagement by citizens in governance.261
Many health policy experts argue for de-linking health insurance from the workplace. Their 
argument is that the economic distortions from an employer sponsored insurance (ESI) system 
outweigh any benefits that come from administrative convenience.
 For that reason, I propose that 
policy-makers consider the potential for workplace-based health insurance risk pools to be a 
foundation for a new health policy public.  
 262
                                                 
256 See Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance As Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 11, 16 (1999). 
257 Id. at 21. 
258 Leonard Fleck has made a similar argument focusing on participation by individuals in the role of patients rather 
than as citizens or members of a risk pool. See Leonard M. Fleck, Just Health Care Rationing: A Democratic 
Decisionmaking Approach, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1597 (1992). 
 The most powerful 
259 See, e.g., STEELE, supra note 3, at 4. 
260 Pat O’Malley, Experiments in Government: Government Analytics and a Strategic Knowledge of Risk 3 (2003) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
261 See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 
114–16 (2003); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 80 
(2000). 
262 DAVID U. HIMMELSTEIN ET AL., BLEEDING THE PATIENT: THE CONSEQUENCES OF CORPORATE HEALTH CARE 19, 
49–53, 118–19 (2001); MARMOR, supra note 248, at 153–58; Briffault & Glied, supra note 234, at 65; David U. 
Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, National Health Insurance or Incremental Reform: Aim High, or at Our Feet?, 
93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 102 (2003). 
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argument against ESI is that it is doubly destructive: it fragments the overall population, thus 
undercutting social insurance principles, and it subsidizes individual health care consumption, 
thus creating moral hazard.263 Political scientist Jacob Hacker convincingly argues that it is path 
dependency, not logical reasoning, that has kept us locked into the workplace system for health 
insurance.264
I find these critiques of ESI to be compelling as rationales for a national, universal system of 
health care delivery. Nevertheless, in this section, I offer a counterperspective: that progressives 
should hesitate before abandoning the workplace as an organizational locus for political 
participation in health system and risk allocation politics, even if financing mechanisms were 
restructured to incorporate a richer mix of public funding. My argument is that infusing such risk 
pools with worker governance can serve both instrumental and normative ends.
  
 265
Workplace-based risk pools for health insurance contain aggregations of individuals who 
share a common employer. Because membership in the plan is determined by reasons other than 
the goal of securing insurance, and because the plan invariably includes persons in a broad range 
of health status categories, ESI plans are “natural risk pools.”
 
266
These same factors also make the ESI risk pool attractive as a site of governance for its 
participants. The link to employment that creates a material reason for individuals not to exit the 
risk pool also provides an incentive for employees to join a participatory governance process, 
were one to be offered. Indeed, I share Michael Gottesman’s intuition that many employees 
might welcome the opportunity to negotiate collectively with employers about health insurance 
benefits and other collective goods, without committing to full-scale union representation on all 
issues.
 The link to employment creates 
a material reason for individuals to remain in rather than to exit the risk pool, which diminishes 
the likelihood of high transaction costs for the insurer. All of these factors make ESI risk pools 
attractive from an insurance perspective. 
267
                                                 
263 See HIMMELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 
 
Most importantly, a workplace health insurance group maps precisely onto a set of rich, 
dense, and strong social relationships. Using the work of Robert Putnam and other social 
scientists, employment law scholar Cynthia Estlund has built a powerful argument that 
democratic theory has underestimated the importance of workplaces in advancing democratic 
ends.  
262, at 15–20, 49–53, 118–19; Briffault & Glied, supra note 234, at 74. 
264 HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE, supra note 105, at 9.  
265 To be clear: I do not argue for any goal less than universal coverage of the population. Proposals for how to 
achieve such universal coverage, however, often include building on the workplace-based system; an example 
would be the new system in Massachusetts. See John Holahan & Linda Blumberg, Massachusetts Health Care 
Reform: A Look at the Issues, HEALTH AFF., w432 (Sept. 14, 2006), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/25/6/w432. One factor in the political reluctance to jettison the 
workplace system is the high level of satisfaction reported by participants. See SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., 
COMMONWEALTH FUND, WHITHER EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE? THE CURRENT AND FUTURE ROLE OF 
U.S. COMPANIES IN THE PROVISION AND FINANCING OF HEALTH INSURANCE 2 (Sept. 2007), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/Collins_whitheremployer-basedhltins_1059.pdf; Sherry A. Glied & 
Phyllis C. Borzi, The Current State of Employment-Based Health Coverage, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 404, 408 
(2004). Large employers also resist abandoning a workplace-based system, although they eagerly seek ways to curb 
their expenses. See John A. MacDonald, The Future of Employment-Based Health Benefits: Will Employers Reach a 
Tipping Point? EBRI NOTES (Emp. Benefit Res. Inst., Wash., D.C.), Feb. 2008, at 2.  
266 COLLINS, supra note 265, at 2; see also Glied & Borzi, supra note 265, at 407. 
267 See Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 80 (1993). 
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Three of Estlund’s assertions stand out as relevant to the project of workplace-based risk-
pool governance. First, people often build their civic skills in the workplace, through discussions 
of political and other issues of public importance conducted in relatively public spaces.268 
Second, outside of family or close friends, social ties at the workplace provide people with a 
stronger sense of belonging than any other institution in their lives.269 Third, there is greater 
racial diversity in the American workplace than in most other civic settings, including 
neighborhoods and schools.270
The network of social connections at work also provides useful prerequisites for effective 
governance of health risk. The social connections in work settings can facilitate the development 
of norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness, which in turn reinforce patterns of cooperation.
 
271 
This foundation of social capital can help to overcome problems of collective action, such as the 
resistance to engaging with difficult allocation decisions (the tragic choices problem) or the 
inclination to reject certain risks for oneself to achieve the gain that would result from someone 
else assuming them (the prisoner’s dilemma problem).272 Moreover, a normative advantage of 
collectively  made decisions about issues such as scope of coverage is that they are made by a 
group operating behind a veil of ignorance as to what serious illnesses they or their families 
might suffer.273
Using workplace-based risk pools also locates the project in a familiar setting. For that 
reason alone, it may be more realistic than proposals for entirely novel forms of participatory 
governance such as “national issues conventions”
  
274 and “deliberation days.”275
Employment-linked insurance groups thus offer a singularly hospitable social environment 
for a democratic experimentalist project to take root. It would be neither plausible nor desirable 
to require every employer-sponsored plan regardless of size to have a risk-pool governance 
structure. But it seems realistic to imagine that policies might be put in place to enable risk-pool 
governance structures in workplaces with a large enough number of employees to constitute a 
robust risk pool and a meaningful degree of diversity.
  
276
Perhaps the bottom-line governance issue is how much power these new structures would 
have and how much discretion and authority employers would retain. From an employer’s point 
of view, a pre-negotiated overall budget would presumably be necessary before they would 
 
                                                 
268 See ESTLUND, supra note 261, at 119 (people discuss such issues more with coworkers than with any category of 
acquaintance other than relatives, and as much as with spouses). 
269 Id. at 7. 
270 Id. at 60. 
271 Id. at 114 (quoting PUTNAM, supra note 261, at 19). 
272 Id. at 115; see also GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978); Arrow, supra note 91.  
273 See Russell Korobkin, Determining Health Care Rights from Behind a Veil of Ignorance, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 
801, 802–04. 
274 JAMES F. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM 3, 93 (1991). 
Fishkin’s approach seeks to create a structure that can serve as a mediating institution between opinion and policy, 
while at the same time fostering greater deliberative interaction among citizens. Although interesting gatherings 
have occurred, the products of these intensive sessions have not punctured the crust of established policy formation 
mechanisms. 
275 BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004). 
276 In another context, that of uninsured persons being organized into a risk pool and provided with access to a menu 
of health insurance policies offered through a government-administered marketplace, similar questions arise 
concerning how democratic the process will be setting the ground rules for participation. The Massachusetts 
Insurance Connector, which sets rates and other terms of enrollment under that state’s new individual mandate to 
purchase health insurance, has developed impressive mechanisms to provide for public input. See Watson et al., 
supra note 239.  
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relinquish what is now unilateral control over specific issues of coverage and rationing. Worker 
release time for those engaged in the governance process, causing some additional firm costs, 
would be required. But external resources, such as private foundation or government funding, 
might provide the other necessary support for such groups. If so, pilot studies of risk-pool 
governance could be conducted on a budget-neutral basis for employers. 
From the employee’s perspective, the most powerful normative objection to the 
development of risk-pool governance mechanisms at the workplace is that it is naïve to imagine 
that such institutions will function outside of the power relations around them. Given these 
inequalities, the question is whether participants will be able to deliberate under conditions of 
egalitarian reciprocity and respect. If the aspiration of deliberative democracy is to create 
institutions which “tie[] the exercise of power to free reasoning among equals,”277
Labor unions and workplace safety and health committees could serve as partial models for 
workplace risk-governance mechanisms.
 the very 
thickness of background social relations in a workplace may make it difficult to achieve that 
result among coworkers.  
278 Indeed, the concept of a risk-governance structure in 
essence duplicates, for non-unionized firms, one of the functions of unions. It thus speaks to the 
strong support among workers for new ways to participate in workplace governance,279 as well 
as the priority that even unionized workers have given to protecting health insurance as a 
benefit.280
An ideal mechanism would facilitate cooperation while effectively deflecting both obvious 
and subtle forms of manipulation and control, and ensuring representation of all worker 
interests.
  
281 The current status, however, is closer to gridlock. Existing labor law restrictions on 
employee representation by entities other than unions block experimentation,282 and the historic 
hostility of U.S. employers to employee organizations may make any degree of cooperation seem 
utopian.283
I do not underestimate the difficulty of these obstacles. Addressing them will necessarily 
give rise to numerous complexities in a governance structure. Cooptation of workers by 
employer interests, the possible capture of the process by those most motivated to further their 
  
                                                 
277 Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185, 193 (Jon Elster ed., 1998). 
278 Workplace safety and health committees mandated by state law have demonstrated effectiveness as third-party 
regulators. See David Weil, Individual Rights and Collective Agents: The Role of Old and New Workplace 
Institutions in the Regulation of Labor Markets, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 13, 30–37 (Richard B. Freeman, et al. eds., 2005). 
279 One survey of American workers found that a large majority of those who favored unions also wanted additional 
mechanisms (e.g. employee associations) that would allow them to influence decisionmaking. See RICHARD B. 
FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 141—43 (1999).  
280 Leslie E. Nulty, Retrospective on Collective Bargaining in the 1980s, in CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 541, 545 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1994). 
281 See Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of the Workplace, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 762–64 
(1994). 
282 See Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millenium: A Historical Review and Critical 
Assessment, 43 B.C.L. REV. 351, 446–48 (2002) (arguing for development of employee participation initiatives); 
Charles B. Craver, Mandatory Worker Participation is Required in a Declining Union Environment to Provide 
Employees with Meaningful Industrial Democracy, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 135, 146–56 (1997) (reviewing non-
union worker democracy institutions in European countries and existing models in the United States); Matthew W. 
Finkin, Bridging the “Representation Gap,” 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391 (2001) (expressing skepticism about 
non-union mechanisms). 
283 See Nelson Lichtenstein, Epilogue: Toward a New Century, in INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: THE 
AMBIGUOUS PROMISE 275, 279–81 (Nelson Lichtenstein & Howell John Harris eds., 1993). 
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self-interest, or the simple failure of group members to fairly represent other workers all come to 
mind as possibilities. The history of gender and racial inequities within unions provides merely 
one example of the fact that more democratic norms in workplace relations are hardly a panacea 
for injustice. 
Although a full discussion of these concerns is beyond the scope of this Article, ground rules 
would be necessary to prevent risk-pool governance groups from exacerbating, rather that 
moderating, inequities in health insurance. One protection would lie in limiting risk-pool 
governance to the largest workplace groups, those with a significant degree of built-in diversity 
of interests. Additionally, legal restrictions to require actuarial justification for limitations on 
coverage would be necessary to counteract tendencies to exclude those with stigmatized 
diseases, such as AIDS/HIV.284
University of Michigan Medical School researchers have achieved hopeful results 
suggesting that democratic structures would improve fairness and equity in access to health 
insurance. They developed an intricate game model for constructing a group health benefits 
package: “Choosing Healthplans All Together (CHAT).”
 
285 Using it in a series of simulations, 
they found that participants were able to reach agreement on a series of trade-offs that they 
accepted as legitimate.286 In one version of the CHAT simulation, a group of insured persons 
was asked to decide whether to allocate resources from their own insurance programs to cover 
uninsured persons. All of the small groups and two-thirds of the individuals elected to do so for 
uninsured children, and one-third of the individuals elected to redirect resources for both adults 
and children who were uninsured.287
The Michigan studies do not answer the question of what would happen in real life if health 
insurance were made subject to more democratic decisionmaking, but new governance studies in 
other contexts, such as urban public schools, can supply other guidelines. Deliberative 
democracy scholars have developed procedures for coordinated oversight of local governance 
projects through measurement, audits, and reviews, together with rules of participation that 
constrain those holding greater social, economic, or political power from dominating group 
dynamics.
 
288
                                                 
284 Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, employers can exclude specific medical conditions from coverage in 
a group health insurance plan, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2000), but the law is unsettled as to whether they must justify 
such an exclusion by demonstrating that there is an actuarial basis for it, compared to other covered diseases. Some 
courts have followed the agency’s interpretation in requiring that insurers justify disability-based distinctions with 
actuarial data. See World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203, 1208–09 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Cloutier v. Prudential 
Ins. Co., 964 F. Supp. 299, 304–07 (N.D. Ca. 1997). The majority of courts, however, have concluded that the anti-
discrimination mandate is satisfied if every enrollee in the plan is offered the same coverage package. Ford v. 
Shering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608–10 (3d Cir. 1998). See generally Sharona Hoffman, AIDS Caps, 
Contraceptive Coverage, and the Law: An Analysis of the Federal Anti-Discrimination Statutes’ Applicability to 
Health Insurance, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1324–30 (2002). 
285 See generally Susan Dorr Goold et al., Choosing Healthplans All Together: A Deliberative Exercise for 
Allocating Limited Health Care Resources, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 563 (2005). 
286 Id. at 591–92; see also Marjorie Ginsburg et al., (De)constructing “Basic” Benefits: Citizens Define the Limits of 
Coverage, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1648, 1650–53 (2006) (presenting selected findings of study regarding compromises 
and tradeoffs in health benefits packages).  
287 See Susan Dorr Goold et al., Will Insured Citizens Give up Benefit Coverage to Include the Uninsured?, 19 J. 
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 868, 870–71 (2004). 
 These can provide at least a starting point for addressing some of the most 
important concerns. 
288 See, e.g., ARCHON FUNG, EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION: REINVENTING URBAN DEMOCRACY 5–7, 22 (2004) 
(describing successful community empowerment project in Chicago centered in an urban school district); NEIL 
GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 101–03 (1998) 
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These issues illustrate the ambitiousness and difficulty of using risk-pool governance 
structures for enhancing democratic norms in health care policymaking. But such questions come 
with the territory of experimentalist projects. My goal here is not to set forth a full blueprint of a 
workplace-based risk-pool governance structure. Rather, it is to encourage the idea of embarking 
on an experimentalist project through which these complexities can be explored. 
 
C. SUMMARY: TOWARD JUSTICE 
 
The proposal that I have outlined speaks to whether and how the concept, identity, and role 
of citizen can become a viable component of health care system governance. But the proposal 
also offers the potential for a new way to advance norms of distributional justice. The theoretical 
constructs that have been deployed thus far to engage the justice and equity aspects of health 
have fallen far short of success. Without claiming too much, I believe that greater attention to 
inscribing democratic norms in the structures of health insurance governance would enhance a 
discourse of interdependency that could, ultimately, result in greater equity.  
Risk governance in health care instantiates a powerful compound of economic policy and 
moral normativity. Its dimensions encompass both persons and conduct.289
But the normative assumptions and values underlying this system are often masked. The 
empirical nature of actuarial understandings masks the power dynamics involved in these 
decisions and makes them seem natural or inevitable, rather than political.
 The practices of 
allocating risk (whether through public or private mechanisms) identify certain risks to be 
collective, others to be assumed by individuals; they mark certain actors as eligible for 
protection, others as not; and they incentivize certain conduct, but not all conduct, as socially 
beneficial because of its tendency to diminish certain forms of risk. Allocating the multiple 
forms of financial risk in the health care system channels and structures choices about who will 
receive what forms of care, who will pay for what kinds of illness, and how quality or negligence 
will be defined.  
290
The equity decisions masked through risk governance have not been effectively engaged 
through our traditional constructs for addressing justice issues. Liberal rights principles have 
never proven adequate or even fully relevant as a basis for confronting the gaping health care 
hole in the quality of American life. Negative liberty principles offer no purchase for contesting 
 This masking 
capacity is heightened in the health care arena, where natural forms of physiological risks are 
intertwined with financial risk in the everyday functioning of health care delivery. 
Managed care has normalized the idea that the health care system is organized around 
interdependency and competition for limited resources. But popular understanding of the 
dominance of risk governance in the system is still largely inchoate.  
                                                                                                                                                             
(describing mechanisms and resources that can be made available to less powerful groups participating in 
collaborative regulation projects).  
289 Ericson et al. note that insurance, the most common technology for risk distribution, “quantifies and commodifies 
moral commitments in every detail of underwriting, loss prevention, and indemnification.” RICHARD V. ERICSON ET 
AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 69 (2003); see also Baker, Insuring Morality, supra note 24. 
290 Commenting on the use of actuarial reasoning in the case of City of L.A. Dep’t of Water and Power v. Manhart, 
Jonathan Simon described actuarial techniques as a “regime of truth [and] a way of exercising power” experienced 
as familiar and neutral methods of computation. Simon, The Ideological Effects, supra note 252, at 772 (arguing that 
the unobtrusiveness of actuarial techniques is one basis of their importance because it diminishes political reaction 
to exercises of power). 
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private actions,291 and even equality mandates extending into the private sector seem off-kilter 
for a problem that does not fit the minoritizing discourse of civil rights issues.292 Moreover, the 
individual fairness focus of a civil rights mandate can cut against an argument for community 
sharing of risk.293
The demographic picture of uninsured Americans also does not easily fit a civil rights 
narrative. Uninsured Americans do not form a cohesive, identity-group style minority. Although 
lack of insurance correlates with lower income,
 
294 the subgroups among the uninsured are 
diverse: low-income workers and their children, self-employed entrepreneurs, and young adults 
who perceive that their need for health insurance is minimal and not worth the expense.295
Communitarian theories could offer more promise.
 
296 If we imagine ourselves as citizens in 
a health republic, we are joined in a community of risk. The overwhelming justice issue is that 
only some individuals are protected against unforeseeable adverse events.297 However, many 
communitarian theories tend to rely on assumptions of homogeneity within the group, which 
give them limited usefulness in the health care context.298
Debates on the ethical dimensions of health care have thus tended to be dominated by the 
conflict between norms associated with the insurance industry’s principle of “fair 
discrimination” in allocating risk on one hand
  
299 and the solidarity norms of social insurance on 
the other.300
                                                 
291 Here I am simply bracketing the rich literature on positive rights. See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE 
(2003); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990). 
292 See generally Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modern Healthcare System: 
Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 215 (2003).  
293 The “basic policy” of a civil rights approach “requires that we focus on fairness to individuals rather than fairness 
to classes.” City of L.A. Dep’t of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978) (invalidating a 
requirement that women employees contribute more than male employees to the pension fund because, on average, 
women live longer than men). 
294 See CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, MORE AMERICANS, INCLUDING MORE CHILDREN, NOW LACK HEALTH 
INSURANCE 2 (Aug. 31, 2007), http://www.cbpp.org/8-28-07health.pdf. 
295 See generally JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, CHARACTERISTICS OF 
THE UNINSURED: WHO IS ELIGIBLE FOR PUBLIC COVERAGE AND WHO NEEDS HELP AFFORDING COVERAGE 1–16 
(Feb. 2007), http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7613.pdf. 
296 See generally Gavin Mooney,“Communitarian Claims” as an Ethical Basis for Allocating Health Care 
Resources, 47 SOC. SCI. MED. 1171 (1998). 
 For those who wish to advance norms of equity in health care, while still 
297 The issue is not subtle: 47 million Americans lack health insurance. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, 
supra note 294, at 1. Of those, the Agency for Health Research and Quality has categorized 17 million as 
“continuously uninsured” because they have lacked coverage for at least four consecutive years. See Agency for 
Healthcare Research & Quality, More than 17 Million Continuously Uninsured; One-Third Are Middle Income, 
AHRQ NEWS AND NUMBERS (Oct. 2007), http://www.ahrq.gov/news/nn/nn100307.htm. Americans without 
insurance are far more likely to receive inferior and inadequate care. See INST. OF MED., CARE WITHOUT 
COVERAGE: TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE 3 (May 2002), 
http://www.iom.edu/Object.File/Master/4/160/Uninsured2FINAL.pdf. Indeed, there is a spillover effect beyond the 
uninsured: in communities with large numbers of uninsured persons, even those who have insurance experience less 
availability of services and receive lower quality of care than persons who live in communities with few uninsured 
persons. See Mark V. Pauly & José A. Pagán, Spillovers and Vulnerability: The Case of Community Insurance, 26 
HEALTH AFF. 1304, 1309–12 (2007). 
298 See Susan H. Williams, A Feminist Reassessment of Civil Society, 72 IND. L.J. 417, 423–24 (1997). 
299 See Clifford & Iuculano, supra note 55, at 1809–10. 
300 See Sharona Hoffman, Unmanaged Care: Towards Moral Fairness in Health Care Coverage, 78 IND. L.J. 659 
(2003); Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 287 
(1993). Opinion surveys document that most Americans believe that a right to health care exists in some form, but 
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acknowledging the risk structure that governs the health system, it has been difficult to find a 
framework that engages both risk and equity in an effective manner.  
I believe that addressing issues of equity within a risk-allocation paradigm is the best way to 
capture and articulate the stakes at issue in the debate. It allows us (indeed, it forces us) to 
articulate who gets included and excluded in the pooling process; how allocation decisions are 
made; and whether there are systems of accountability and checks and balances built in to 
produce a risk allocation system that is equitable, as well as efficient and flexible, in determining 
how and to whom various kinds of risk are apportioned. Calling the system for what it is, and 
how it actually operates, may turn out to be the most effective way to address the underlying 
values issues. 
 Establishing a risk-centered normative frame will not, of course, resolve the tensions on its 
own. Like the rhetorics of insurance advertising described by Tom Baker301 and Deborah 
Stone,302 risk talk is highly elastic, capable of framing normative issues around invocations of 
both solidarity and short-term self-interest. 303
As an intellectual project, my proposal incorporates the egalitarian potential of insurance as 
a governance technology within the realm of democratic theory. The veil of ignorance never 
fully falls away from risk-pool decisionmaking. Even after a history of past claims has 
accumulated, the constellation of future claims is always uncertain for individual participants. 
For that reason, risk-pool governance unites within the health care system what Michael Dorf 
 It thus leaves the field open to the most successful 
norm entrepreneurs in a health care debate that Americans have never fully resolved.  
My proposal addresses the lack of a framework through which advocates for greater equity 
can make their claims. It suggests a new institutional venue in which the inherent tensions and 
trade-offs between equity and efficiency in health care might be negotiated in a more open and 
democratic process. 
This model of justice is frankly process-oriented. It is designed to function within, and 
thereby to alter, any health care system that is centered on risk allocation, regardless of whether 
such a system is structured around private or public institutions. The democracy gap exists both 
in the status quo and in currently proposed reforms. Regardless of whether, or how, the financing 
mechanisms change for our health care system, democratizing the policy inputs into that system 
will remain important.  
Whether greater democracy would lead to greater distributional justice is the central 
question that we cannot answer without actual trial and error. It is at least possible that in a sector 
as vast and complicated as the American health care system, a strategy that enables greater 
fairness in a localized setting may be the most effective strategy for achieving fairness on a more 
global scale. If individuals can successfully grapple with issues of equity in their own risk pools 
and create fair outcomes, perhaps some of those lessons and successes might be replicated on the 
national scale.  
                                                                                                                                                             
there is no consensus as to its scope or how to achieve it. See Robert J. Blendon et al., Americans’ Views of Health 
Care Costs, Access, and Quality, 84 MILBANK Q. 623, 638–42 (2006); Mark Schlesinger, Reprivatizing the Public 
Household? Medical Care in the Context of American Public Values, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 969, 989 
(2004); Robin Toner & Janet Elder, Most Support U.S. Guarantee of Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2007, at A1. 
301 Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract 
Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1400–16 (1994). 
302 Stone, supra note 300, at 287–89. 
303 Indeed, a risk-centered frame, while necessary, can also be problematic. From a progressive political perspective, 
a shortcoming of risk talk is that it does not carry the same intrinsic egalitarian valence as rights talk. 
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and Charles Sabel describe as the two core meanings of democracy: the deliberative function of 
securing the good of all and the calculative function of achieving the good of each.304
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The era of actuarial medicine is not likely to end soon. The integrated system of financing 
and service delivery established by managed care, designed and implemented to control costs, 
has now changed the practice of medicine in ways that are likely to remain in place, regardless of 
which particular efforts at reform are successful.  
Mechanisms governing and distributing financial risk are what drive the health care system 
today, employing an interlocking set of policies and mutually reciprocal practices evident in both 
public and private sectors. All actors within the system—including not only insurers but also 
providers and patients—assume aspects of financial risk, and the system’s viability is contingent 
on risk allocation. Understanding how the legal system reinforces this risk-centered governance 
provides a better explanation than do current health law paradigms of how the many strands of 
doctrine within that body of law cohere and why its substantive importance matches its financial 
heft.  
Central to my project is the goal of framing risk-governance practices within political theory 
and specifically as a problem for democracy. From that perspective, I argue that the doctrinal 
complexities of ERISA preemption law can be read as a charter of corporate sovereignty in a 
health risk-governance universe. To counter that dominance, I identify a new and important role 
for health insurance risk pools as virtual jurisdictions with political and social meaning, rather 
than merely actuarial units. In doing so, I argue that for something as central to our lives and our 
economy as the health system, we should interrogate much more vigorously than we have so far 
our conventional understanding of whether and how democratic norms and structures could 
supply mediating processes for risk-centered decisionmaking. 
                                                 
304 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 246, at 274–75. 
